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IN THE NAME OF PATENT STEWARDSHIP:  




While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has admirably 
commandeered its stewardship of patent law—Congress bestowed the 
Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals since 
1982—the court has unabashedly extended its reach, unwelcomed, into 
commercial law. Camouflaged in the name of patent stewardship, the 
Federal Circuit’s foray into commercial law has yielded unexpected and 
unjustifiable results. This Article argues that, paradoxically, to maintain its 
stewardship of patent law, the Federal Circuit should not invoke patent 
law to rationalize its decisions concerning commercial law, which have 
dramatically altered established commercial law. This encroachment into 
commercial law, which is within the provenance of state law, destabilizes 
federalism causing uncertainty in state law. The Federal Circuit must 
refrain from encroaching into commercial law as it has no authority to 
inject itself into state law making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider two scenarios: In the first, your client has exhausted her 
personal net worth by pumping a total of $10 million in loans into a startup 
company she founded. Lately, the startup could not obtain funding from 
outside sources. The struggling company, however, still must pay its 
employees and essential creditors in order to keep the nascent business in 
operation. Neither white knight nor kind angel has come to the rescue. The 
client had no other option but to use her own financial resources in making 
the necessary loans to the startup. To secure the preexisting loans, the 
startup grants the client a security interest in the startup’s patents, pursuant 
to a security agreement.  
You help draft the agreement and perfect the client’s security interest in 
the patents by recording the security interest in all appropriate registration 
offices. Subsequently, matters become worse for the struggling company. It 
faces a hefty judgment in patent litigation that it asserted earlier against a 
third party, and that third party now levies the patents. Armed with your 
thorough understanding of secured transaction law and priority rules, you 
assist your client with foreclosing on the patents, as you know that under 
established secured transaction law, the client has priority over the third 
party’s subsequent judicial lien on the patents.  
The third party opposes the client’s foreclosure on the patents. The 
dispute between your client and the third party finds its way, eventually, 
into the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. To your 
astonishment, the Federal Circuit holds against your client. Unequivocally, 
the court states that your client’s security interest in the patents for the $10 
million in loans is a fraudulent transfer of the struggling company’s assets. 
In other words, under Federal Circuit law, a grant of security interest in 
2
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patents for preexisting loans is a fraudulent transfer.1 
The message delivered by the Federal Circuit in the above scenario will 
send chills down the spines of battle-tested founders of startup companies. 
It will cause them to think twice before pouring their personal net worth 
into their own struggling companies. 
In the next scenario, your client wants to acquire a target company 
without assuming any attached liability. As an experienced corporate 
transactions attorney, you avoid the liability for your client by negotiating a 
deal to acquire only the target company’s assets, including patents, for 
$500 million. Asset purchases often require extensive due diligence, which 
your team of experienced lawyers has labored many hours to complete.  
Like any corporate transactions attorney, you know state contract law 
very well and employ the best practices in the field. You know that 
mistakes made during due diligence can result in some assets not being 
properly identified and transferred at closing, and you have, therefore, 
drafted the master purchase agreement and ancillary agreements with 
utmost care. You include common provisions in these agreements to 
retroactively transfer assets that are accidentally left out and subsequently 
discovered after closing to have the same effective date for transfer as 
stated in the master purchase agreement. After all, the client is paying $500 
million for the target company’s assets, and both parties to the transaction 
agree that your client is the owner of the assets as of the effective date.  
After closing, you learn from the client that it does not have one of the 
transferred patents, though the disclosure schedule includes the patent. You 
inform the client about the provisions for retroactivity of ownership of any 
transferred assets and assuage the client’s concern. The seller immediately 
cooperates with you to address the mistake, and the client is happy again, 
as it now owns the transferred patent as of the effective date pursuant to the 
master purchase agreement. The client’s happiness, however, is short-
lived. When the client later asserts a patent infringement action against an 
alleged infringer, it faces a challenge mounted by the defendant. The 
infringer challenges your client’s standing to bring suit in the first place on 
the basis that your client does not own the patent at issue. In its decision, 
the Federal Circuit ignores well-established state contract law on 
retroactivity of ownership of assets transferred pursuant to a sale and 
purchase agreement; it rules that your client was not the owner of the 
patent when the complaint was filed because ownership cannot be made 
retroactive under the Federal Circuit’s contract law for patents!2 
You are speechless. How do you inform the client that their $500 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App’x 924, 928–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 2. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (per curiam); Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1337–
38 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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million acquisition failed to give them ownership of the patent that they 
paid for? How do you explain to the client that state law is now irrelevant 
when the Federal Circuit identifies patents in the transaction and insists on 
the application of the Federal Circuit’s own law, displacing state law? 
Unfortunately, the above scenarios and others just as surprising are not 
the imaginary work of an erudite academic. They are the results of the 
Federal Circuit’s extensive overreach into commercial law, including state 
contract law, secured transaction law, fraudulent conveyance law, and trust 
law. This Article is part of a broader inquiry into the Federal Circuit’s 
patent exception approach; it is a follow up on a recent article on Patent 
Prudential Standing.3 In reviewing the Federal Circuit cases on patent 
prudential standing, this Article observes that while the court has 
admirably commandeered its stewardship of patent law—Congress first 
bestowed the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in 
19824—the court has extended its reach—unabashedly and without 
welcome or congressional approval—into state-law areas, disturbing the 
balance carefully struck under federalism. Often, in the name of patent 
stewardship, the court’s foray into established state law areas yields 
unexpected and unjustifiable results.  
This Article will focus on a number of commercial law cases where the 
Federal Circuit has overreached its patent jurisdiction. This Article argues 
that, paradoxically, to steady its stewardship of patent law, the court should 
not invoke patent law to rationalize its decisions concerning state 
commercial law that dramatically alters established state law. 
Encroachment on state law creates uncertainty and destabilizes federalism, 
therefore the Federal Circuit must restrain itself, particularly as it has no 
authority to inject itself into state law making.5 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
has long instructed, federal courts must not exercise judicial preemption of 
state law absent explicit federal law or policies justifying the exclusion of 
state law.6 It is time for the Federal Circuit to retract its extensive reach 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Patent Prudential Standing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
17 (2013) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s patent prudential standing rulings and arguing, inter 
alia, that the Federal Circuit’s patent prudential doctrine is unnecessary and should be abrogated). 
 4. Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d 532, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Jason Rantanen 
& Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2007, 2008–09 (2014) (discussing the creation 
of the Federal Circuit by Congress and its “exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals”).  
 5. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases 
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1238 n.66 (2004) (noting that federal 
courts are increasingly deciding questions of state law “based on federal rather than state court 
precedent” and arguing that problems of legal certainty due to federal judicial usurpation have 
returned). Federalism is the cornerstone of the U.S. governance structure where dual or divided 
sovereignty operates to “preserve individual freedom, regional autonomy, political experimentation, 
and the representational advantages of republicanism.” Anthony Kammer, Privatizing the 
Safeguards of Federalism, 29 J.L. & POL. 69, 69 (2013) (observing that the Constitution reflects 
federalism “principles in its design and, as it is currently interpreted, contains a number of 
mechanisms—both structural conflicts and judicially enforced checks—to ensure that power 
remains dispersed among state and federal governments with separate and competing jurisdictions” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 6. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).  
4
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into areas exclusively controlled by state law.7 
Part I of this Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Federal 
Circuit’s overreach in state contract law, particularly in the area concerning 
sale and purchase of property assets. There are three Sections in this Part of 
the Article. The first Section presents the established contract law and best 
practices in corporate assets transactions. The second Section focuses on a 
Federal Circuit decision against the backdrop of established contract law 
and best practices. The last Section offers a critique of the Federal Circuit’s 
decision and judicial preemption of state commercial law, and portrays 
potential consequences of the court’s unfettered reach under the disguise of 
patent law. 
Organized similarly, Part II focuses on the Federal Circuit’s overreach 
in state secured transactions law and fraudulent conveyance law. This Part 
(1) examines the established secured transactions law and practices in 
commercial financing; (2) analyzes the Federal Circuit’s case on the 
acceptance of security interest in a patent; and (3) discusses the chilling 
message emanating from the Federal Circuit’s new law on secured 
transactions and fraudulent conveyance. 
Likewise, Part III identifies and discusses the Federal Circuit’s 
overreach in state trust law, particularly in cases concerning liquidating a 
trust formed under a bankruptcy confirmation or liquidation plan. This Part 
explains how and why a liquidating trust is created in bankruptcy. The Part 
also examines the relationship between the trust and its beneficiary and 
how the relationship is in fact for the benefit of the beneficiary. With this 
background, the Part dissects the Federal Circuit’s case in this area and 
critiques its new trust law. 
In Part IV, this Article turns to federalism principles to offer its critique 
of the Federal Circuit’s overreach in commercial law. This Article 
concludes that destabilization of federalism must promptly end in order to 
foster the richness of existing state law and preserve the vision of 
governance as dictated by and in the Constitution. 
I.  SALE AND PURCHASE OF ASSETS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
CONTRACT LAW 
This Part analyzes the Federal Circuit’s overreach in state contract law. 
It starts by presenting the state of established contract law and then 
presents a contrary Federal Circuit decision. It concludes by critiquing this 
decision and outlining the negative consequences that ensue from it. 
A.  The Law of Sale and Purchase of Assets 
In the competitive marketplace, companies acquire other target 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See id. at 87–88; Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Wheeldin 
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). 
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companies for strategic reasons.8 There are two common ways a company 
acquires a target: (1) the company may wish to conduct a stock acquisition 
of the target, or (2) the company may wish to purchase only the assets from 
the target.9 A stock acquisition means the company will assume the target’s 
liability,10 whereas an asset purchase may permit the company to cherry-
pick the desirable assets and therefore avoid liability.11  
Although the nonliability rule in asset purchases seems attractive,12 
conducting an asset purchase is frequently time-consuming because teams 
of business and legal advisors often must engage in extensive due diligence 
prior to the closing of the deal.13 Mistakes are sometimes made in 
identifying and transferring all the assets from the seller to the acquirer in 
the transaction. Parties often include provisions in the various sale and 
                                                                                                                     
 8. For a report on technology companies engaged in acquisition activities in 2012, see 2012 
Tech M&A Activity Report – Private Company Acquisitions, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.cbinsights.com/blog/acquisitions/tech-mergers-acquisitions-deals-2012-report 
(indicating that 2277 private technology companies were acquired globally in 2012 and the acquirers 
paid $46.9 billion for the targets); see also Samuel Wagreich, Private Tech Company Acquisitions 
Are up: Report, INC., http://www.inc.com/samuel-wagreich/private-tech-company-acquisitions-are-
up-report.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2013). 
 9. Another form of acquisition is a merger. See Wilson Chu, Negotiated Acquisitions of 
Company Shares and Assets in the United States—Pitfalls and How to Avoid Them, 13 U.S.-MEX. 
L.J. 55, 57 (2005) (“[A]cquisition agreements take one of three basic forms: stock deals, asset deals, 
and merger agreements.”). 
 10. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 7.2, at 703 (2d ed. 2010); see Sharon L. 
Cloud, Note, Purchase of Assets and Successor Liability: A Necessarily Arbitrary Limit, 11 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 791, 794 (1986) (discussing stock acquisition and liability). 
 11. GEVURTZ, supra note 10, § 7.2, at 703–04 (“Unlike the sale of assets transaction, the 
buyer cannot pick and choose which liabilities it will assume and thus eschew the assumption of 
unknown claims.”). There are limits to avoiding liability in an assets purchase. For example, 
successor liability may hold the corporate successor liable for the predecessor’s defective products. 
See Cloud, supra note 10, at 796–800 (identifying four different exceptions to the nonliability rule 
in asset purchases). 
 12. See Cloud, supra note 10, at 794 (discussing the general rule of nonliability in asset 
purchase deals). 
 13. See W. Ashley Hess, Recent Developments and Trends in Middle-Market M&A Due 
Diligence Practices, ASPATORE (Apr. 2013), 2013 WL 2137397, at *2. Due diligence review is 
important to the acquisition process: 
The due diligence review and findings affect the way the parties negotiate and 
draft the transaction agreement—a fact that may seem obvious, but is not always 
fully appreciated. In some instances, the due diligence review uncovers deal-
breakers or “show-stoppers,” and the parties decide not to complete the 
transaction. In deals that move forward, the findings from due diligence help the 
parties assess the risks of the transaction and allocate responsibility for those risks 
in the transaction agreements. In this way, the due diligence review plays a role in 
shaping the representations and warranties, covenants, closing conditions, and 
other provisions in the transaction agreements. In addition to disclosure schedule 
content, issues identified in due diligence may give rise to carve-outs or 
exceptions to certain deal provisions. 
Id. 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/3
2015] THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S OVERREACH IN COMMERCIAL LAW 133 
 
purchase agreements to address, in the post-closing phase, the discovery of 
inadvertent mistakes made during the due diligence investigation phase.14 
A closer look at common practices in asset purchases reveals that in a 
typical asset purchase, the seller and acquirer generally enter into a master 
asset purchase agreement (APA) and several ancillary documents.15 The 
APA sets forth the terms of the transaction and provisions for the assets to 
be transferred. For example, in a technology assets purchase, the APA 
typically includes intellectual property (IP) provisions for the general scope 
of the purchased IP assets, rights and liabilities, and covenants “governing 
the parties’ conduct relating to the purchased IP . . . assets after signing” 
relevant contractual agreements and closing the transaction.16 The APA’s 
IP provisions also typically reference ancillary documents such as IP 
assignment and license agreements, which contain much greater details 
that the parties will execute at the closing time of the deal.17  
Parties to a sale and purchase of assets often anticipate potential 
problems that may arise in the future after the transaction occurs. 
Therefore, they routinely draft the IP assignment to “typically include[] a 
‘further assurances’ clause that obligates the seller to work with the buyer” 
to ensure that the buyer actually obtains all the assets that the seller has 
sold to the buyer.18 Lawyers for the contracting parties recognize that there 
are post-closing actions that must be taken in order “to document the 
transfer of the purchased IP assets in connection with the transaction.”19 
This means the lawyers will file assignment documents with the 
appropriate IP registries, whether in the United States or abroad, to update 
the ownership of the IP assets purchased pursuant to the APA.20 
The parties also generally contemplate when the closing day will 
actually be for the transaction and draft the APA with the “effective time” 
to be the closing date,21 an earlier date, or a date after the closing date.22 
The effective time is binding on the parties, ensuring that the asset transfer 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Daniel Glazer, Intellectual Property: Asset Purchases, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 1314, 
1345–46 (2012) (explaining various post-closing issues). 
 15. For sample APAs, see Asset Purchase Agreement, ONECLE, http://contracts.onecle.com/
type/19.shtml (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
 16. Glazer, supra note 14, at 1333. 
 17. Id. at 1343–45. 
 18. Id. at 1345. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1345–46. 
 21. See, e.g., Severstal U.S. Holdings, LLC v. RG Steel, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that “Effective Time” is the closing date); Marathon Projects Ltd. v. 
Creative Designs Int’l., Ltd., No. 10 CV 2396(RPP), 2011 WL 1002424, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 
2011) (stating that in the APA the “Effective Time is defined as 11:59 p.m. on the Closing Date” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Marzoll v. Marine Harvest US, Inc., No. 08-261-B-S, 2009 WL 
4456321, at *29 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2009) (noting that the “Effective Time” is the closing date). 
 22. See VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, 967 N.Y.S.2d 338, 
340–41 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that the closing date was two months before the “Effective Date”). 
7
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contractually occurs between the parties.23 The effective time is also used 
to calculate and ascertain whether a claim that the buyer may have against 
the seller after the assets sale transaction has occurred is still within the 
zone of protection.24 
To encourage corporate commercial transactions such as asset transfers, 
courts routinely treat these transactions simply as contractual transfers of 
property governed by state law.25 Contract law of the jurisdiction selected 
by the parties to the asset transfer agreement governs claims and disputes 
arising from the contract.26 Courts recognize that the primary rule of 
                                                                                                                     
 23. For example, in Old T.B.R., Inc. v. Billing Res., LLC (In re Old T.B.R., Inc.), Ch. 11 Case 
No. 07-52890-ASW, Adv. No. 09-5074, 2011 WL 5402506 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011), the 
APA provided: 
On the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement, at the 
Closing (but effective as of the Effective Time) Seller [Debtor] shall sell, convey, 
assign, transfer and deliver to Purchaser [New TBR], and Purchaser shall 
purchase, acquire and accept from Seller, free and clear of all liens, claims and 
encumbrances (except for the Assumed Liabilities), all of Seller’s right, title and 
interest in and to all of the assets, properties and business of every kind and 
description, wherever located, real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible, 
owned or held by Seller as the same existed immediately prior to the Closing other 
than the Excluded Assets . . . . 
Id. at *12 (alterations in original).  
 24. For example, in VisionChina Media Inc., the buyer brought action against the seller, 
alleging that the buyer’s claims against the seller were within the one-year period from the effective 
time as negotiated by the parties to the APA. 967 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The court determined that 
“[a]lthough the buyers offer several reasons why the contractual one-year limitation period should 
be ignored . . . , none are persuasive.” Id.  
 25. Sales of assets or acquisitions are today’s modern corporate contracts. See GRT, Inc. v. 
Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., No. 5571-CS, 2011 WL 2682898, at *12 & n.65 (Del. Ch. July 11, 
2011) (emphasizing the contractual nature of the transaction); In re Fitch, 174 B.R. 96, 101 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ill. 1994) (“Determination of the significance of the remaining obligations [of a contract] is 
made by looking to state law, as state law controls with regard to property rights in assets of a 
debtor’s estate.” (citing Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard P’ship), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th 
Cir. 1989))). 
 26. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1972) (according presumptive 
validity to choice-of-law provisions in the contract); Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 411 F.3d 63, 
67 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New York law where “[t]he parties do not dispute that New York law 
applies” pursuant to the contract); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 
F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law where the contract at issue contained a New 
York choice-of-law provision). 
In cases where the contract fails to include a choice-of-law provision, courts still look to state 
contract law to determine the meaning of a patent assignment contract. See Euclid Chem. Co. v. 
Vector Corrosion Techs., Inc., No. 1:05CV080, 2007 WL 4460628, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 
2007) (applying Ohio law to determine the meaning of a patent assignment contract), vacated, 561 
F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (providing still that “[c]onstruction of patent assignment contracts 
is a matter of state contract law” (quoting Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
8
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contract law is that when the parties express their intent in clear terms,27 
courts “will not resort to construction.”28 For instance, if the parties have 
intended and stated in the contract that the transaction will be effective “as 
of” an earlier date, courts would hold that the contract is retroactive to the 
earlier date.29  
Indeed, courts look at the plain language of the contract and hold that 
the transfer is deemed to occur at the effective time.30 VisionChina Media 
Inc. v. Shareholder Representative Services, L.L.C. is an example of how the 
court looks to effective time for the calculation of the critical period during 
which buyers can assert claims against the sellers as negotiated by the 
                                                                                                                     
 27. For example, “[u]nder New York law, a written contract is to be interpreted so as to give 
effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the unequivocal language they have employed.” 
Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 206 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978)). 
 28. Bruhl v. Thul, 134 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1965) (“The court will not resort to 
construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.”); 2 
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:61, at 894 (4th 
ed. 2007) (“[I]t seems clear that, where the parties themselves agree that a contract between them 
should be given effect as of a specified date, absent the intervention of third-party rights, there is no 
sound reason why that agreement should not be given effect.”); see, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. 
Ring, 286 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. 1982) (“[T]he effective date of a contract is not the date of execution 
where the contract expressly states that its terms are to take effect at an earlier date.”); Goldstein v. 
Ipswich Hosiery Co., 122 S.E.2d 339, 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (“It is elemental that contracting 
parties may agree to give retroactive effect, between themselves, to their contracts as they may see 
fit.”); FH Partners, LLC v. Complete Home Concepts, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 387, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012) (“The primary rule in interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intent of the parties and 
give effect to that intent.” (quoting Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Azia Contractors, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 640, 
642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 886 S.W.2d at 642 (“Where there is no ambiguity 
in a contract, the intent of the parties is to be determined from the contract alone and the courts will 
not resort to construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous 
language.”); see also Massey v. Exxon Corp., 942 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Kentucky law 
clearly allows parties to a contract to predate a contract and both parties will be bound by that 
agreement.”). 
 29. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Tandem Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(“When a written contract provides that it shall be effective ‘as of’ an earlier date, it generally is 
retroactive to the earlier date.”), aff’d, 526 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975). Some courts go further: “The 
law does not support the blanket conclusion that a retroactive effective date in a contract is only 
enforceable when the evidence demonstrates that the parties had agreed to the material terms of 
their contract as of the retroactive date.” FH Partners, 378 S.W.3d at 396. Courts are willing to 
consider:  
where a contract is ambiguous with respect to its effective date, the absence of an 
explanation for a retroactive effective date, and evidence that the parties had not 
agreed to the material terms of their contract as of the purported retroactive 
effective date, are relevant considerations in resolving the ambiguity.  
Id. 
 30. See VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, 967 N.Y.S.2d 338, 
340–41 (App. Div. 2013). 
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parties.31 In that case, the buyers purchased assets from the sellers pursuant 
to a merger agreement, which contained a number of representations and 
warranties.32 The contractual provisions provided that the buyers could 
bring claims against the sellers upon finding any of the representations or 
warranties to be untrue or inaccurate within the one year period before the 
effective time.33 The buyers failed to timely assert claims against the sellers 
during the allotted period, as the court found: 
Thus, the buyers negotiated terms that would have allowed 
them to discover the alleged fraud and to cancel the 
agreement but they then failed to take advantage of these 
terms. Moreover, the documentary evidence which allegedly 
reveals the fraud, that is, the E & Y report, was [i]ndisputably 
in the buyers’ possession within the one-year contractually 
negotiated period for making a claim against the sellers, but 
the buyers chose not to make a notice of claim.34 
The VisionChina Media court looked to state contract law to resolve the 
dispute relating to assets transferred pursuant to the agreement. Likewise, 
if a sale and purchase transaction includes the transfer of IP assets, courts 
recognize that “[b]ecause patents have the attributes of personal property, 
the transfer of patents and property rights . . . in patents are governed by 
state law.”35 Thus, transfer and ownership of patents are matters governed 
by state contract law.36 Indeed, courts must apply state law when 
determining the “contractual obligations and transfers of property rights, 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See id. at 344. 
 32. Id. at 340–41. 
 33. Id. at 341, 343. 
 34. Id. at 344. 
 35. St. John’s Univ., N.Y. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation 
omitted) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 
832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 36. See Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“It may seem strange at first blush that the question of whether a patent is valid and infringed 
ordinarily is one for federal courts, while the question of who owns the patent rights and on what 
terms typically is a question exclusively for state courts. Yet that long has been the law.”); see also 
Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2343 
(2010). 
Similarly, when federal bankruptcy law intersects with contract law, courts look to state law to 
govern contractual issues. See, e.g., River Prod., Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 
738 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Even in bankruptcy proceedings, courts of appeals look to state law to decide 
contract issues.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that the basic federal rule in 
bankruptcy is that the state law governs the substance of claims, Congress having generally left the 
determination of property rights in the assets of bankrupt’s estate to state law.” Travelers Cas. & 
Surety Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 451 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Therefore, “when the Bankruptcy Code uses the word ‘claim’ . . . it is usually referring to 
a right to payment recognized under state law.” Id. 
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including those relating to patents.”37 For example, according to state 
contract law, in a case where the patentee has already assigned its 
invention to the assignee within the scope of the assignment, the former 
patentee cannot later claim ownership of the transferred invention that has 
subsequently been granted a patent.38 Likewise, state law controls the 
outcome in a case involving foreclosure sale of patents by a secured 
creditor at an auction and change of title of ownership with respect to the 
purchased patents.39 Similarly, “actions . . . vindicat[ing] property rights in 
patents are subject to state statutes of limitations, and state law doctrines 
[that] determin[e] when a limitations period may be tolled.”40  
B.  Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC 
Contrary to established state contract law governing sales and purchases 
of assets, the Federal Circuit has developed its own approach. The Federal 
Circuit has recently ignored the contracting parties’ choice-of-law 
provision in the contract, creating its own contract law in disregard of long-
standing choice-of-law rules, which accord significant weight to a choice-
of-law provision in a contract.41 Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC42 
is a glaring example of the Federal Circuit’s expansive overreach into state 
contract law for commercial sale and purchase transactions involving 
patent property under the disguise of exclusive jurisdiction over patents. 
Abraxis centered on a commercial transaction involving the sale and 
purchase of assets.43 Here, the transaction was between two pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 38. See Reid v. Gen. Motors Corp., 489 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617, 621 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (“[The 
patent at issue] is within the scope of the IP Assignment. Such an assignment automatically 
transfers title ‘by operation of law’ once an invention comes into being. Plaintiffs are without title 
and, therefore, without standing to bring the instant suit, and Defendants’ motions to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted” (citation omitted)). 
 39. See Sky Techs. LLC, 576 F.3d at 1376–79 (holding that the chain of title in the purchased 
patents was not broken from the defaulted debtor to the secured creditor and then to the subsequent 
purchaser of the foreclosed patents). 
 40. See St. John’s Univ., 757 F. Supp. at 191 (“Because Defendants invoke constructive 
notice of the Liquisolid Patents to defeat Plaintiff’s claim to equitable tolling of New York statutes 
of limitations and trigger the fraud discovery accrual rule on the date of the Liquisolid Patents’ 
issuance, the issue is controlled by New York State law, and the court must determine whether a 
New York court would impute knowledge of the Liquisolid Patents’ existence to Plaintiff.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Advani Enters., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 162–63 (2d Cir. 
1998) (noting that federal choice-of-law rules accord considerable weight to a choice-of-law 
provision in a contract); see also KLATMW, INC. v. Elec. Sys. Prot., Inc., No. 09-CVS-16393, 
2011 WL 1675633, at *1–2, *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 2, 2011) (noting that “[t]he case arises from 
the sale of assets of an ongoing business pursuant to an asset purchase agreement containing certain 
warranties, incorporating a choice of law,” and holding that the remaining claims should be 
resolved pursuant to New York law because the “consensual choice of law clause in the purchase 
contract dictates the application of New York law to the contract claims”). 
 42. 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011). 
 43. Id. at 1361. 
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companies, seller AstraZeneca (AZ) and buyer Abraxis.44 According to the 
press release about the important sale, the transaction included eight 
anesthetic and analgesic drug products and their patents,45 as part of a 
larger $350 million assets sale.46 
The transaction unfolded in a typical fashion that commercial lawyers 
are intimately familiar with.47 The parties entered into an APA dated April 
26, 2006, and selected New York law to govern the contract.48 Under the 
APA, AZ “shall, or shall cause one or more of its Affiliates to, Transfer to 
the Purchaser . . . all of the right, title and interests of the Seller and its 
Affiliates in and to” the transferred patent assets.49 Among various 
ancillary documents executed as part of the assets’ acquisition by Abraxis, 
on June 28, 2006, the parties signed an IP Assignment Agreement, which 
referred back to the APA and stated that the “provisions of this instrument 
are subject to the terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreement.”50 The 
IP Assignment Agreement also included a “Further Assurances” clause 
affirming that the seller, AZ, will “do, execute, acknowledge and deliver, 
or will cause to be done, executed, acknowledged and delivered, any and 
all further acts, conveyances, transfers, assignments, and assurances as 
necessary to grant, sell, convey, assign, transfer, set over to or vest in 
Buyer any of the Transferred Intellectual Property.”51 
The IP Assignment Agreement listed the transferred patents, including 
patent numbers 4,870,086 (‘086), 5,670,524 (‘524), and 5,834,489 (‘489), 
in Schedule A.52 The transaction, however, was incomplete as AZ 
subsequently discovered that some of its affiliates had failed to formally 
assign their patents, including patents ‘086, ‘524, and ‘489 that were part 
of the assets transferred to Abraxis.53 To correct their mistakes, these 
affiliates (transferors) immediately transferred the pertinent patents to AZ 
(transferee), and AZ then conveyed the patents to Abraxis (the original 
buyer) in accordance with the “Further Assurances” clause by executing 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. 
 45. AstraZeneca’s press release announced that it would receive $350 million from Abraxis 
for the part of the deal involving anesthetics and analgesic products including, Xylocaine, 
Polocaine, Naropin, Nesacaine, Sensorcaine, Astramorph, Emla Cream, and Diprivan. See Press 
Release, AstraZeneca, AstraZeneca and Abraxis BioScience to Co-Promote Cancer Therapy 
ABRAXANE; Abraxis Bioscience to Acquire AstraZeneca’s U.S. Anaesthetic and Analgesic 
Product Portfolio (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.astrazeneca.com/Media/Press-releases/Article/
20060427--AstraZeneca-and-Abraxis-BioScience-to-copromote-canc. 
 46. See id.; Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, No. 07-1251, 2009 WL 904043, at *1 
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 47. See Glazer, supra note 14, at 1333, 1343–46 (describing asset purchase transactions and 
necessary documents). 
 48. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1361; id. at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 1368–69 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
 50. Id. at 1369. 
 51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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additional assignment documents in March 2007.54 The assignment 
documents each stated that: 
[T]his instrument is being executed by the parties to enable 
the Transferee to further convey to Buyer that portion of the 
Transferred Assets included in the Asset Purchase Agreement, 
dated as of April 26, 2006 . . . pursuant to which Transferee 
agreed to sell to Buyer and Buyer agreed to purchase from 
Transferee the Transferred Assets, all as more particularly set 
out in the Purchase Agreement, with consummation of the 
transactions . . . deemed to occur at the Effective Time on the 
Closing Date.55  
Subsequently, the original seller, AZ, and buyer Abraxis confirmed with 
each other that Abraxis now had owned all “right, title, and interest” to the 
patents “since no later than June 28, 2006.”56 As noted above, the original 
APA was executed as part of the asset acquisition on April 26, 2006.57 
The above transaction was a typical transfer of property by contract 
within the provenance of state law. Since the contracting parties to the 
transaction selected New York law to govern the contract, courts should 
have applied New York law.58 The transferred patents at issue were 
subsequently the subject of patent infringement litigation brought by 
Abraxis against a third party, Navinta, and within the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Federal Circuit.59 Navinta challenged Abraxis for lack of standing in 
bringing the infringement case in the district court.60 Applying New York 
contract law on retroactivity, the district court found that Abraxis was the 
owner of all the transferred assets, including the patents identified in 
Schedule A that were inadvertently omitted as of the Closing Date, June 
28, 2006.61 When Navinta appealed, instead of applying New York state 
contract law on the transfer of patents pursuant to the APA, as the district 
court had correctly done,62 the Federal Circuit panel majority had a 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 1369–70.  
 55. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Abraxis brought its patent infringement litigation against Navinta on March 15, 2007, 
after Abraxis acquired the assets for $350 million from AZ and affiliates in the April 26, 2006 
transaction with the closing date of June 28, 2006. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 
No. 07-1251, 2009 WL 904043, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 625 
F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 60. Id. (noting the defendant’s lack of standing argument). 
 61. See Abraxis Bioscience, 2009 WL 904043, at *4. This is consistent with the district court 
finding that “[g]iven this retroactive effect, the IP Agreement would then operate to transfer title 
from AZ[] to Abraxis as of that date as well” for the omitted patents that were later assigned. Id.  
 62. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1360; id. at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The 
court thus erases the trial, nullifies the judgment, cancels the appeal, and sends the case back so that 
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different idea. The panel majority asserted that because the transfer of 
property in this case involved patents, and because whether there was an 
assignment of patents would affect the buyer Abraxis’s standing to bring 
an infringement suit against others, the case was “a matter of federal law” 
and therefore had to be “resolved by Federal Circuit law.”63 Accordingly, 
the panel majority applied a string of Federal Circuit decisions on patent 
assignments and promises to assign.64 These decisions have nothing to do 
with commercial sales or corporate asset transfers that included patent 
assets under state contract law.65  
The panel majority completely ignored New York law on contracts for 
transfers of property assets, as its opinion neither discussed nor cited to any 
New York state court decision on the transfer of assets contract.66 Applying 
Federal Circuit law on patent assignment of future inventions, the panel 
majority treated the asset sale and purchase merely as one of many 
assignments of future invention cases and ruled that under the patent 
assignment documents, Abraxis did not own the patents until November 
12, 2007.67 Therefore, the panel majority concluded that Abraxis lacked 
standing to bring the patent infringement suit against Navinta in the 
complaint filed on March 15, 2007.68 
If the panel majority had adhered to federalism principles 69 and applied 
New York contract law on transfers of property assets, as it should have 
done, the outcome would have been different. Under New York contract 
law, a written contract with a provision of an effective date before or after 
the date the parties sign the contract is valid.70 This means if the parties 
select a date to be the effective date for the property conveyance, that date 
will govern the transaction and be the date the buyer becomes the owner of 
                                                                                                                     
the parties and the district court and this court can do it all again. However, the court has not shown 
reversible error in the district court’s ruling on the question of standing, a ruling based on state 
contract and commercial transaction law.” (emphasis added)).  
 63. Id. at 1364 (majority opinion) (citing DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 
517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 64. Id. at 1364–65. 
 65. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 583 
F.3d 832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011)); DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290; 
IPVenture, Inc. v. ProStar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Schreiber 
Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Speedplay, Inc. v. 
Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 
1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 66. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1359 (relying strictly on federal precedent to analyze 
standing). 
 67. Id. at 1365–66. 
 68. Id. at 1365–66, 1368. 
 69. See infra Part IV. 
 70. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Tandem Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 
aff’d, 526 F.2d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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the transferred assets.71 Likewise, if the parties to a sale of property execute 
a contract with a particular closing date as the effective date, the closing 
date will be the date on which the property is conveyed from the seller to 
the buyer.72  
Under the parties’ reasonable expectations that state contract law would 
be applied, the sellers and buyers elected to convey the patent property, 
among other transferred assets, from AZ to Abraxis for $350 million on the 
closing date. Pursuant to the APA, the closing date was June 28, 2006,73 
and the instrument—the IP Assignment Agreement included as part of the 
acquisition transaction—was binding on the parties.74 Accordingly, on 
June 28, 2006, Abraxis became the (purported, according to the majority) 
new owner of the transferred assets, including the patents.75 Both AZ and 
Abraxis, like many other sophisticated parties in complex commercial sale 
transactions, understood that inadvertent mistakes are sometimes made and 
that parties to the transaction generally include provisions like “further 
assurances” to correct these mistakes in order to effectuate the parties’ 
intent in the original contract.76  
In this case, the IP Assignment Agreement contained the “Further 
Assurances” provision under which the seller contractually had to deliver 
to the buyer all the properties that the seller had already sold to the buyer 
pursuant to the Master Purchase Agreement.77 When the mistake—that not 
all the patents had been conveyed as of the Closing Date—was discovered, 
the parties corrected the mistake pursuant to the “Further Assurances” 
provision and the buyer was deemed to own the transferred patents as of 
the Closing Date, June 28, 2006.78 
The “Further Assurances” provision allowed for the patent conveyance 
to be retroactive.79 This was consistent with New York law,80 which allows 
written contracts to be retroactive if the contract so provides in its relevant 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 175–76 (1923) 
(applying New York law, the court held that “[i]t was competent for the parties to agree that the 
effective date of the policy should be one prior to its actual execution or issue; and this, in our 
opinion, is what they did” and that “[p]lainly[,] their agreement was effective”). 
 72. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, 368 F. Supp. at 1270. 
 73. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, No. 07-1251, 2009 WL 904043, at *1 
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2009), rev’d, vacated, and remanded, 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 74. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1370 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion).  
 76. See id. at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]t is not unusual [for parties] to 
transfer a complex set of related assets” through a master agreement and ancillary agreements, such 
as a “Further Assurances” clause). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1369–70. 
 79. See id. at 1370. 
 80. New York law of contracts allows written contracts to be retroactive. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
Tandem Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). If the contract provides that it will 
become effective “as of” an earlier date, then the contract is “retroactive to the earlier date.” Id. 
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provisions.81 Furthermore, New York law of contracts permits retroactivity 
to correct unintended omission or mistake in an earlier agreement.82  
The panel majority, however, ignored New York law of contracts when 
it noted the transaction involved patent assignments, immediately 
extending its patent reach. With its exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent 
appeal cases,83 the panel majority committed a grave error when it 
zealously applied Federal Circuit law to a sale contract and disregarded the 
parties’ choice of law contract provision. Sales of patents are simply sales 
of property, and such property conveyances are governed by state contract 
law.84 The commercial sale of existing patents in the present case must be 
governed by New York law of contracts, absent any preemption or federal 
interest or policy.85 The panel majority extended its patent jurisdiction too 
far when it completely abandoned state law in interpreting the sale 
contract.86 
By ignoring the long-standing rule that construction of a patent 
assignment agreement is a matter of state law, the Federal Circuit dictated 
a new rule that if a commercial sale involved patents, the transaction 
automatically falls within the purview of the Federal Circuit and that the 
Federal Circuit Court would apply its own law to construe the patent 
                                                                                                                     
 81. See id. Under New York law, ‘“[t]he fundamental, neutral precept of contract 
interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.”’ Anita Babikian, 
Inc. v. TMA Realty, LLC, 912 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Greenfield v. Philles 
Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 82. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. (In re Local 
Union 1567), 478 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (App. Div. 1984) (permitting retroactive application of 
arbitration provision despite “the fact that the grievances arose while there was no agreement to 
arbitrate”); Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Buffalo, 453 N.Y.S.2d 314, 317 (Sup. Ct. 
1982) (permitting retroactivity of a collective bargaining agreement to cover the period between the 
new contract execution date and the expiration of the old contract); Matthews v. Jeremiah Burns, 
Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 841, 847 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (permitting the amended agreement to be retroactive to 
the date of the original amendment). 
 83. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988).  
 84. See Euclid Chem. Co. v. Vector Corrosion Techs., Inc., 561 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“Construction of patent assignment agreements is a matter of state contract law.” (quoting 
Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 85. The Federal Circuit was divided on this point. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta 
LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (per curiam) (arguing that, 
“[n]otwithstanding New York [contract] law,” the parties could not “retroactively override federal 
law to revive failed agreements”). But see id. at 1241 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
preempting state contract law in the instant case neglects clear Supreme Court precedent “restricting 
preemption of state law” and which precedent “uniformly proscribed the judicial creation of a 
special federal rule absent a significant conflict between state law and some federal policy or 
interest” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 86. The panel majority’s approach is contrary to other Federal Circuit decisions on contract 
interpretation. See generally Tri-Star Elecs. Int’l, Inc. v. Preci-Dip Durtal SA, 619 F.3d 1364, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“An assignment of a patent is interpreted in accordance with statutory and 
common law of contract . . . .”). 
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assignment agreement.87 Moreover, the Federal Circuit law, on which the 
panel majority erroneously relied, concerned promises to assign future 
inventions in an employment context, not massive corporate sale of assets 
involving existing patents.88 By justifying its decision that the contract was 
a matter of federal law under Federal Circuit precedents, the panel majority 
has created a patent exception to the general rule of contract 
interpretation.89 The panel majority should have known that the patent-
exception approach has already been squarely rejected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in recent years.90 
The panel majority’s decision has caused uncertainty in future 
commercial contracts involving conveyance of patents. Parties to a sale 
contract with a choice-of-law provision expect predictability. They expect 
courts to apply state law and the contract law of the jurisdiction selected. 
Though Abraxis Bioscience concerned a commercial sale of existing 
patents, the panel majority arbitrarily ignored the actual commercial 
transaction, state contract law, and the New York choice-of-law provision. 
Worse, while the parties to the contract did not dispute that the transferred 
assets in a complex transaction of $350 million did include the pertinent 
patents on the Closing Date of June 28, 2006,91 the panel majority injected 
its judicial preemption to support its conclusion that the transfer occurred 
in November 2007.92 The panel majority’s decision was contrary to the 
terms that the parties agreed to in the commercial contract.93 
The Federal Circuit’s assault on commercial law did not end there. 
Abraxis subsequently petitioned the Federal Circuit for a hearing en banc, 
and the Federal Circuit, in a per curiam decision, denied the en banc 
                                                                                                                     
 87. The panel majority erroneously relied on Federal Circuit cases on promises to assign 
inventions in future time, as explained in the dissenting opinion. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. 
Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 115 (2011). 
 88. See id. at 1364–65 (majority opinion) (“Because the APA is a promise by AZ[] to assign 
the relevant patents to Abraxis when AZ[] obtains legal title, under our ‘promise to assign’ cases, a 
subsequent written agreement is necessary to consummate the assignment.”). 
 89. See id. at 1364 (“[T]he question of whether a patent assignment clause creates an 
automatic assignment or merely an obligation to assign is intimately bound up with the question of 
standing in patent cases. We have accordingly treated it as a matter of federal law.”). 
 90. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122, 136 (2007) (rejecting 
Federal Circuit precedent ruling that “a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an Article 
III case or controversy with regard to validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent because the 
license agreement ‘obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension’ that the licensee will be sued for 
infringement” (alterations in original) (quoting Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006) (rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s application of a general Patent Act exception to a “long tradition of equity 
practice” and holding that the well-established principles of equity “apply with equal force to 
disputes arising under the Patent Act” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 91. See Abraxis Bioscience, 625 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 1372. 
 93. See id. 
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petition, with three judges penning a concurrence over the dissent of two 
other judges.94 Again, at this juncture, as seen in the concurrence, the 
Federal Circuit ignored the acquisition of the patent assets by Abraxis as 
part of the complex asset sale and purchase transaction.95 The Federal 
Circuit summarily dismissed the case as a “simple” matter because the 
court believed that Abraxis did not own the patents when it filed the patent 
infringement action.96 The concurrence emphasized that the case was 
correctly decided under the Federal Circuit’s precedents on patents.97  
C.  The Federal Circuit’s New Contract Law for Patents 
A cursory glance at Abraxis Bioscience may not mean much to patent 
scholars and the patent bar, as the case can be viewed simply as a matter of 
lack of standing to bring an infringement suit under § 261 of the Patent Act 
due to the plaintiff’s not having ownership of the patents on the filing date. 
The decision, however, is anything but simple. By hiding behind patent 
law, the Federal Circuit has created its own federal common law of 
contracts to govern commercial sales of assets where the assets happen to 
include patents.98 The Federal Circuit failed to explain why it requires 
parties to asset transfers involving patents to apply Federal Circuit contract 
law in complete disregard of state contract law provisions negotiated and 
chosen by both the seller and acquirer of the assets.99 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit, in both the panel majority opinion and 
the subsequent three-judge concurrence opinion rejecting the petition for 
an en banc hearing, did not identify any conflict between federal law or 
policy and state contract law to justify the imposition of Federal Circuit 
created contract law.100 The Federal Circuit provided no justification for 
why it had expressly displaced New York contract law. The court also 
offered no explanation for why New York contract law must not be applied 
to the master APA for the $350 million sale of assets, including the 
existing patents owned by the seller and its affiliates at the time of sale, 
and the ancillary IP Assignment Agreement executed by the contracting 
parties. Under New York contract law, the agreements plainly operated to 
vest the title in the patents and other assets at the “Effective Time,” and the 
contracting parties to the massive sale of corporate assets did not dispute 
the transaction.101 In fact, the contracting seller even provided further “belt-
                                                                                                                     
 94. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam).  
 95. See id. at 1240 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1240–41. 
 98. Id. at 1241 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. (noting that the panel majority did not identify a conflict between state law and 
federal policy or interest). 
 101. See supra notes 79–82, 91–92 and accompanying text. 
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and-suspenders confirmation” of what it had already conveyed under New 
York law.102 The court’s complete disregard of state contract law on 
transfer of property ownership is evidence of the Federal Circuit 
overextending its patent jurisdiction. 
Without identifying any conflict between federal and state law to 
legitimize displacing New York contract law, the Federal Circuit looked to 
its own precedents on promises to assign future inventions.103 The question 
addressed in those cases centers on “whether a patent assignment clause 
creates an automatic assignment or merely an obligation to assign.”104 The 
Federal Circuit’s solution to the question is “intimately bound up with the 
question of standing in patent cases,” and therefore it held that federal law 
should displace state contract law.105  
This decision was incorrect for a number of reasons. First, the 
precedents have nothing to do with contracts to sell massive assets 
inclusive of existing patents. Second, the precedents have nothing to do 
with corporate sale transactions by contracting parties who have negotiated 
for each of the contract provisions in exchange for large monetary value in 
the acquisition of a target company through asset purchases. Third, the 
precedents have nothing to do with the clear intent of the parties through 
execution of a master sale agreement and ancillary agreements to vest title 
in the acquirer on an effective date agreed upon by the parties. Finally, the 
precedents have nothing to do with the body of state contract law 
recognizing property that actually has been transferred retroactively on the 
effective date.106 
Erroneous wholesale application of Federal Circuit precedents to 
Abraxis Bioscience has created a new body of Federal Circuit contract 
law.107 Under this new law, contracting parties can no longer rely on state 
contract law to govern the terms of the contracts. The contracting parties 
cannot rely on their choice of law as the controlling law for their contract. 
They also cannot rely on the typical contractual provisions in a sale and 
asset purchase agreement. “Effective date” and “further asssurances” 
provisions are now meaningless as contracting parties cannot rely on state 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Abraxis Bioscience, 672 F.3d at 1247 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 1364 (majority opinion). 
 104. Id. (quoting DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. Id. (quoting DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, 
e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 583 F.3d 832, 841 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); IPVenture, Inc. v. ProStar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 
1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1094 (2008); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., 
Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 106. See Abraxis Bioscience, 672 F.3d at 1241, 1243–46, 1247 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 1241 (“The panel majority’s creation of federal common law to govern assignments 
of existing patents conflicts not only with our precedent, but with longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent restricting judicial preemption of state law.”). 
19
Nguyen: In the Name of Patent Stewardship: The Federal Circuit's Overreac
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
146 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
law for vesting title retroactively.108  
Moreover, the new Federal Circuit’s contract law has devastating 
consequences for commercial law and practices. Complex acquisition of a 
target company through asset sales will be discouraged because for any 
patent that is not assigned through ancillary agreement by the sellers and its 
affiliates on the date the parties execute the master APA, the acquirer will 
have no recourse against a third party for subsequent infringement, 
regardless of whether the seller has already sold and the acquirer has 
already purchased all of the seller’s and its affiliates’ assets.109 
A rigid, bright-line rule has been created in the Federal Circuit’s patent 
vacuum to disrupt contracting parties’ expectation for certainty in their 
corporate commercial transactions. Companies engaging in strategic 
decisions to buy or sell corporate assets that include patents now face a 
new burden and associated cost. What company would want to be in 
Abraxis’ situation: Paying $350 million for assets from a seller and its 
affiliates; paying professionals to assist in negotiating the deal; conducting 
due diligence and drafting the contracts; subsequently bringing an 
infringement litigation against a third party and battling the patent 
infringement action on the merits for over three years, including a full trial 
on infringement; and a judicial determination relating to the Hatch–
Waxman Act for a debilitating outcome after the district court’s judgment 
was nullified by the new Federal Circuit contract law dictating that Abraxis 
had no ownership of the patents and therefore lacked the standing to bring 
the infringement suit in the first place?110 
II.  SECURITY INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ASSETS AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
This Part focuses on the Federal Circuit’s overreach in state secured 
transactions law and fraudulent conveyance law. It examines established 
secured transactions law and practices in commercial financing and a 
contrary Federal Circuit case. Finally, it discusses the impact of the case on 
secured transactions. 
A.  The Law of Secured Transactions and Fraudulent Conveyances 
Secured transactions are common commercial transactions that occur 
daily.111 In a nutshell, when a party is in need of credit, it may attempt to 
                                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 1241–46. 
 109. See id. at 1241. 
 110. Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1791, 1819 (2013) (“According to recent opinions by some Federal Circuit judges, the court 
has improperly leveraged choice-of-law doctrine to expand the scope of federal common law and 
restrict the scope of state contract law. This dispute . . . might be the next doctrinal battle within the 
Federal Circuit’s federalism relationship.” (footnote omitted)). 
 111. See, e.g., Dollar General Seeks $3.15 Billion to Refinance Secured Debt, MONEYNEWS 
(Apr. 8, 2013, 3:10 PM), http://www.moneynews.com/Companies/Dollar-General-refinance-KKR-
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obtain credit from a lender. Typically, the lender does not want to extend a 
credit line or make a loan to the borrower without any security for the 
repayment of the loan.112 This means the lender will demand that in 
exchange for the loan, the borrower must grant a security interest in its 
personal, not real, property assets to the lender.113 If the loan is secured, in 
the event that the debtor is unable to meet the scheduled repayments, the 
secured creditor can accelerate the debt114 and foreclose on the debtor’s 
collateral property.115 Also, to obtain priority among other creditors of the 
debtor, the lender wants to place other creditors on notice by perfecting its 
security interest in the debtor’s collateral property through filing a 
financing statement with the Secretary of State’s Office where the debtor is 
deemed to be located.116 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC-9) governs secured 
transactions, and all states have adopted UCC-9.117 Secured transactions 
law recognizes that the debtor and the secured creditor often enter into an 
agreement that covers future advances118 and after-acquired collateral 
                                                                                                                     
debt/2013/04/08/id/498393; Sterling Consolidated Secures $2.45 Million Senior Bank Debt, 
REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/idUSnGNX4
TNZFK+1df+GNW20131010; JCPenney Announces Consummation of $2.25 Billion Term Loan 
and Initial Settlement of Its Tender Offer and Consent Solicitation, JCPENNEY (May 22, 2013), 
http://ir.jcpenney.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70528&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1823443 (announcing that 
JCPenney entered into a new five-year $2.25 billion senior secured term loan credit facility).  
 112. WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2 (5th ed. 2012); 
see Dana Cimilluca & Sam Schechner, Alcatel-Lucent Secures $2.1 Billion Debt Financing, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732398
1504578177982789220970 (subscription required) (“The new loans will mostly be secured by the 
Paris-based company’s U.S. assets . . . . [including] a portfolio of patents from the company’s 
storied Bell Labs research arm and at least part of the company’s fast-growing data-networking 
business.”). 
 113. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2010) (addressing the scope of secured transactions). 
 114. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS § 25-3, at 887 (2000) (discussing the prevalence of acceleration as an option to 
secured parties). 
 115. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (permitting the secured party, upon the debtor’s default, to 
“reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim”); id. § 9-607 (addressing 
collections and enforcements by a secured party); Kathy Cabral & Teresa Wilton Harmon, Remedies 
Outside the Box: Enforcing Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
BUS. L. TODAY (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2012/08/03_
cabral.html (discussing remedies available to secured parties upon default of the debtor).  
 116. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . a financing statement must be 
filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 114, 
§ 22-10, at 779 (describing perfection by filing as “the most common method of performing a 
security interest under Article 9”). 
 117. James W. Bowers, Some Economic Insights into Application of Payments Doctrine: 
Walker-Thomas Revisited, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 245 (2014). 
 118. See U.C.C. § 9-323 (addressing future advances). 
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property assets.119 For example, the secured creditor may make additional 
loans to the debtor pursuant to the agreement signed by the parties, and the 
additional loans will be secured by the debtor’s existing collateral 
property.120 There is no need for the parties to execute additional 
agreements each time the secured creditor issues a new loan to the 
debtor.121 Likewise, the parties may enter into an agreement wherein the 
debtor will acquire new property after the execution date, and the newly 
acquired property will serve as collateral to secure the original loan.122 
Again, the parties will rely on the original agreement without signing any 
new agreement to cover the newly acquired collateral property.123 
Also, secured transactions law allows the lender to receive a security 
interest in the debtor’s collateral property for an antecedent debt. Section 
203 of UCC-9 states that a security interest is attached and enforceable 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See id. § 9-322 (discussing conflicting security interests and priority therein). Specifically, 
comment 5, example 4 states: 
On February 1, A makes advances to Debtor under a security agreement covering 
“all Debtor’s machinery, both existing and after-acquired.” A promptly files a 
financing statement. On April 1, B takes a security interest in all Debtor’s 
machinery, existing and after-acquired, to secure an outstanding loan. The 
following day, B files a financing statement. On May 1, Debtor acquires a new 
machine. When Debtor acquires rights in the new machine, both A and B acquire 
security interests in the machine simultaneously. Both security interests are 
perfected simultaneously. However, A has priority because A filed before B. 
Id. § 9-322 cmt. 5, ex. 4. 
 120. Example 1 in Official Comment 3 of U.C.C. § 9-323 illustrates the common practice of 
having the original security agreement and filed financing statement cover future advances or loans:  
On February 1, A makes an advance secured by machinery in the debtor’s 
possession and files a financing statement. On March 1, B makes an advance 
secured by the same machinery and files a financing statement. On April 1, A 
makes a further advance, under the original security agreement, against the same 
machinery. A was the first to file and so, under the first-to-file-or-perfect 
rule . . . A’s security interest has priority over B’s, both as to the February 1 and as 
to the April 1 advance. It makes no difference whether A knows of B’s intervening 
advance when A makes the second advance.  
Id. § 9-323 cmt. 3 ex. 1; see also In re Smink, 276 B.R. 156, 166 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The 
future advance clause at issue clearly states that it will secure any future and additional advances on 
the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust, as well as, any other debts incurred by the grantors, 
or any of them, including those represented by, inter alia, subsequent promissory notes. This 
particular future advance clause, albeit ‘boilerplate language,’ is clear and unambiguous.”). 
 121. See In re Smink, 276 B.R. at 166.  
 122. See, e.g., First Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 2d 802, 811 (W.D. Ky. 2013) 
(“[T]he UCC ‘shall be liberally construed and applied.’ Section 355.9–204 sets forth no 
requirement for particular language in order to create an interest in after-acquired collateral. 
Therefore, while the traditional ‘hereafter acquired’ language is not present, the language that is 
present clearly indicates that future assets were intended to be secured.”). 
 123. Id.; U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . a security agreement may 
create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collateral.”). 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/3
2015] THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S OVERREACH IN COMMERCIAL LAW 149 
 
between the secured party and the debtor when the secured party has given 
value to the debtor, the debtor has a right to the collateral property, and the 
debtor has authenticated a security agreement which contains a description 
of the collateral.124 The “value” given by the secured party to the debtor 
can be loans or credit extended to the debtor from the secured party125 or 
preexisting debt the debtor owed to the secured party.126 To illustrate this, 
assume a debtor has borrowed money from a lender and the loan is 
originally unsecured. Later, the debtor grants the lender a security interest 
in the debtor’s property to secure the debtor’s repayments of the loan to the 
lender.127 Consequently, the security interest is enforceable between the 
debtor and the secured lender, as all requirements under § 203 of UCC-9 
are met. If the lender then perfects its security interest in the collateral 
property by filing the financing statement in the correct filing office,128 the 
perfected security interest is enforceable against any third party and attains 
priority over junior secured creditors,129 bankruptcy trustees, and unsecured 
creditors.130 
Moreover, a lender obtaining security interest in the debtor’s property 
for preexisting debt is itself not a fraudulent conveyance under state law. 
Most states have modeled their fraudulent transfer statutes after the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).131 Also, as noted previously, all 
fifty states have adopted UCC-9.132 Texas and California, for example, are 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See U.C.C. § 9-203.  
 125. See Sterling Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int’l, Inc.), 
20 B.R. 633, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding the security interest had attached because “[t]he 
“debtor signed a security agreement describing the collateral, the bank gave value to the debtor in 
the form of loans and the debtor had property rights in the claims for tax refunds”). 
 126. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchs. State Bank v. Teveldal, 524 N.W.2d 874, 878 n.4 (S.D. 
1994) (“[P]reexisting debt may supply ‘value’ for attachment of a security interest.”). 
 127. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Seminole v. Hooper, 104 S.W.3d 83, 84 (Tex. 2003); 
Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 128. In addition to filing the financing statement, the secured party can utilize other methods of 
perfection of security interest, depending on the types of collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-312(b) 
(addressing perfection by taking possession of the collateral); id. § 9-304 (addressing perfection by 
taking control of deposit accounts); id. § 9-305 (addressing perfection by taking control of 
investment property); id. § 9-306 (addressing perfection by taking control of letter-of-credit rights). 
 129. See id. § 9-322 (addressing priority among conflicting security interests and agricultural 
liens in the same collateral and setting forth rules for determining that priority). 
 130. See id. § 9-317 (stating that an unsecured security interest is subordinate to creditors who 
have filed the financing statement or perfected the security interest). U.C.C. § 9-317 also provides 
that a security interest that is perfected prior to a lien creditor’s interest perfection will have priority. 
See id. § 9-317(a)(2) (providing that a security interest is subordinate to the rights of “a person that 
becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of that time” (emphasis added)).  
 131. See CORNELL U. L. SCH., Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator, LLI, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#frcon (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).  
 132. Changes to UCC Article 9 Effective July 1, 2013, CREDIT TODAY (July 2012), 
http://www.credittoday.net/public/Changes-to-UCC-Article-9-Effective-July-1-2013.cfm (noting 
that all fifty states have adopted the 2001 version of UCC-9); see also Bowers, supra note 117, at 
245 (providing that “all states” have adopted the latest version of UCC-9). 
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among the states that have adopted both UFTA and UCC-9.133 The Texas 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) and the California Fraudulent 
Transfer Law are virtually identical.134 
For example, the Texas Supreme Court in First National Bank of 
Seminole v. Hooper135 held that the insolvent debtor’s conveyance of its 
property to the bank to further secure preexisting debt was not a fraudulent 
transfer.136 On January 4, 1990, the bank originally loaned Ernest Thornton 
$300,000, and Thornton granted the bank a security interest in the debtor’s 
accounts, gas contracts, chattel paper, general intangibles, and 
equipment.137 Over the next two years, the bank made an additional loan of 
$100,000 to the debtor.138 In early 1993, Thornton was already insolvent.139 
On March 30, 1993, Hooper & Sons Investment Company obtained a 
$950,000 judgment against Thornton arising from a dispute between the 
two parties.140 Two weeks later, while still insolvent and in disregard of the 
Hoopers’ judgment, Thornton granted to the bank a security interest in 
additional collateral, namely conveyance of a particular deed of trust in the 
Owego system, to secure the preexisting debts.141 Soon thereafter, the bank 
proceeded to foreclose on the collateral.142 The Hoopers then sued seeking 
damages from the bank, alleging that Thornton’s conveyance of the Owego 
property to secure antecedent debts while insolvent was fraudulent.143 
Applying TUFTA, which was modeled after UFTA,144 the jury found 
that Thornton defrauded the Hoopers when he conveyed the Owego 
property to secure the preexisting debt to the bank. The jury found that 
Thornton was indeed insolvent when he transferred the property to the 
bank,145and the property was not exchanged for reasonably equivalent 
value.146 Thus, the jury awarded the Hoopers $700,000.147 
                                                                                                                     
 133. CREDIT TODAY, supra note 132; CORNELL U. L. SCH., supra note 131 (listing California 
and Texas among the states that adopted the UFTA); see also Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 608, 
610–11 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing the history of the Uniform Fraudulent Act and California’s 
adoption of the model law). 
 134. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04(a)–(b) (West 2014), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 24.005(a)–(b) (West 2014). 
 135. 104 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2003).  
 136. See id. at 84; see also J. Richard White & Jeffrey T. Arnold, Real Property, 57 SMU L. 
REV. 1157, 1167–68 (2004). 
 137. First Nat’l Bank of Seminole, 104 S.W.3d at 84.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. See id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. See id. at 86 (“Our interpretation of the asset to be valued in this context comports with 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, upon which TUFTA was modeled.” (emphasis added)).  
 145. Id. at 84–85.  
 146. Id. at 85. Under TUFTA, a transfer is fraudulent if the debtor makes the transfer intending 
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (West 
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The bank eventually appealed the case to the Texas Supreme Court. 
“[T]he bank [did] not challenge the jury’s findings that Thornton was 
insolvent and intended to defraud the Hoopers” when Thornton transferred 
the security interest in the additional property.148 The bank instead asserted 
that “because the transfer was made to secure a valid antecedent debt, 
reasonably equivalent value was given as a matter of law.”149 The court 
recognized that in a secured transaction, from the debtor’s perspective “the 
value of the interest in the collateral transferred to the creditor can never be 
more than the amount of the debt. The value of the collateral is therefore 
irrelevant to the ultimate question because the excess over the debt is not 
lost to the debtor or other creditors.”150 Consequently, the court found that 
in the present case, the value of the Owego collateral that Thornton had 
conveyed to the bank “could not have been more than the amount of 
Thornton’s debt to the Bank.”151 Accordingly, “the Bank gave reasonably 
equivalent value for the deed of trust lien,” and the jury judgment for the 
Hoopers therefore could not be sustained.152 In addition, the court noted 
that there was no evidence that the bank intended to assist Thornton in 
evading his creditors. The court held that there was no fraudulent transfer 
as a matter of law because “the value of the interest in an asset transferred 
for security is reasonably equivalent to the amount of the [preexisting] debt 
that it secures.”153  
The above decision illustrates that state courts, in interpreting the 
conveyance of security interest in debtor’s property to satisfy an antecedent 
debt, hold that the transfer does not amount to fraudulent conveyance.154 
                                                                                                                     
2014). Additionally, a transfer is also fraudulent—irrespective of the debtor’s intent—if the debtor 
receives less than the asset’s reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer, and the 
debtor:  
(A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which 
the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the 
business or transaction; or (B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should 
have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay 
as they became due.  
See id. § 24.0005(a)(2)(A)–(B).  
 147. First Nat’l Bank of Seminole, 104 S.W.3d at 85.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 86 (quoting Anand v. Nat’l Republic Bank of Chi. (In re Anand), 210 B.R. 456, 459 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. Id. at 86–87. 
 152. Id. at 87. 
 153. Id. at 84; see also Martin v. McEvoy, No. 34254-1-I, 1996 WL 335996, at *4 (Wash. Ct. 
App. June 17, 1996) (“To establish constructive fraud . . . the evidence must show that the debtor 
did not receive reasonably equivalent value. Thus, if value was received and that value was 
reasonably equivalent, constructive fraud cannot be show[n].”). 
 154. See also Mark S. Scarberry, A Critique of Congressional Proposals to Permit 
Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 635, 650 n.57 (2010) 
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This type of transaction is widely prevalent. Even in cases where the debtor 
is both insolvent and defrauding other creditors, the debtor’s grant of a 
security interest to secure an antecedent debt is not fraudulent if the 
transfer has been exchanged for reasonable equivalent value and there is no 
evidence that the secured party is aiding the debtor in committing fraud.155 
B.  Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.  
The Federal Circuit similarly opined on a commercial law decision 
involving patents in Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.156 The 
focus of the litigation was on security interest in patents.157 Amr Mohsen 
was the founder of Aptix, a hardware-logic-emulation technology 
company.158 In an effort to keep the company operational, Mohsen 
personally made numerous loans to Aptix—totaling more than $9 
million—in order to pay employees and other creditors.159 In exchange for 
the loans, Aptix granted Mohsen a security interest in Aptix’s patents in 
July 2000.160 Mohsen perfected the security interest in the patents by 
following the filing requirement under California’s version of UCC-9 in 
August 2000.161 
Next, Aptix brought a patent infringement action against its competitor, 
Quickturn. The district court dismissed the case in June 2000 and ordered 
the parties to negotiate attorney’s fees resulting in a $4.2 million award for 
Quickturn.162 The case was then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which 
affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s ruling, and the 
                                                                                                                     
(noting that non-bankruptcy law allows “preferences to stand and does not consider them to be 
fraudulent” and further that the law provides that “‘[v]alue is given for a transfer or an obligation if, 
in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or 
satisfied’” thus “rendering most payments of antecedent debts non-fraudulent” (alteration in 
original) (quoting UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (1984)); Steven A. Beckelman & Daniel 
P. D’Alessandro, Defending Claims of Fraudulent Transfers Against Lenders, 125 BANKING L.J. 
512, 514–15 (2008) (stating that “where a lender deals with a borrower at arm’s length and receives 
fair value, in the form of payment or a security interest, for any loan extended to the borrower, 
securing or satisfaction of an antecedent debt will not constitute a fraudulent transfer under UFTA, 
as an act to ‘hinder, delay or defraud any [other] creditor of the debtor’” and concluding that 
“[t]herefore, as where a lender receives a security interest in an asset of a debtor that exceeds the 
value of the debt itself, a transaction is not lacking good faith, or seen as an act to hinder, delay or 
defraud, where the lender is aware that the borrower has other creditors” (alteration in original)); 
William F. Savino & David S. Widenor, Commercial Law, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 569, 618–19 
(2006) (discussing New York law providing that the grant of security interest in exchange for an 
antecedent debt is not a fraudulent transfer). 
 155. See First Nat’l Bank of Seminole, 104 S.W.3d at 85–87. 
 156. 148 F. App’x 924, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 925–26.  
 159. Id. at 926. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id.  
 162. Id. 
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parties subsequently entered into a payment agreement in 2002.163 Around 
the same time, when Quickturn could not collect the payment of the 
judgment, it levied Aptix’s assets. Mohsen then initiated a third party claim 
to Aptix’s patent collateral property based on his already perfected security 
interest from July 2000.164 Perceiving Mohsen’s third party claim to be a 
“fraudulent scheme” to prevent recovery of its award against Aptix, 
Quickturn moved to enforce judgment.165 The district court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing and subsequently entered an order voiding Mohsen’s 
security interest in the patents after finding that Aptix granted the security 
interest to Mohsen with “actual intent . . . to hinder or delay satisfaction of 
the judgment due” to Quickturn.166 Mohsen appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
and eventually had the case transferred to the Federal Circuit.167 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The panel 
majority voided Mohsen’s security interest in the patents because it 
believed that Mohsen’s receipt of the security interest in the patents in 
exchange for the loans that he had made to Aptix was for the purpose of 
defrauding the other creditor, Quickturn.168 The court relied on the fact that 
Aptix was insolvent when it granted a security interest in the patents to 
Mohsen and the transfer occurred just before a substantial judgment was to 
be entered against Aptix.169 The panel majority concluded that the security 
interest was a fraudulent transfer,170 ignoring the reality that Mohsen had 
made numerous antecedent loans to the struggling Aptix in order to keep 
the company in operation because it could not obtain funding elsewhere to 
pay employees and other creditors. The panel majority claimed that 
because Mohsen did not receive security interest for some of his prior 
loans to Aptix in the past, the security interest that he received in July 2000 
in exchange for loans that he made to Aptix was a badge of fraud.171  
C.  The Federal Circuit’s New Law on Security Interest and 
Fraudulent Conveyance  
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Aptix Corp. shows its lack of 
understanding of secured transaction law and fraudulent conveyances. 
If the Federal Circuit had a better understanding of state laws on 
secured transactions and fraudulent conveyances (as articulated, for 
illustration purposes, in the Texas Supreme Court’s case in First 
National Bank of Seminole) a different outcome would have been 
expected. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit, with its weak grasp of 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 926–27. 
 164. See id. at 927. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 927–30. 
 169. Id. at 928. 
 170. See id. at 929. 
 171. Id. 
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state commercial law, fails to recognize fundamental concepts in 
commercial law. 
Worse, the Federal Circuit claimed in Aptix Corp. that it applied 
California law on secured transactions and fraudulent transfer.172 The 
Aptix Corp. court, however, missed some pivotal legal principles. First, 
the court was unaware that in secured transactions, debtors routinely 
convey security interest to secure or satisfy antecedent debt. Indeed, 
California’s law recognizes the legitimacy of the grant of a security 
interest in property to secure antecedent debt, as reflected in the 
codified statutes on fraudulent transfers.173 This means that under 
California law, Aptix was allowed to grant a security interest in 
property to secure antecedent loans provided to it by Mohsen. Second, 
California law specifically notes that “a transfer for security is 
ordinarily for a reasonably equivalent value notwithstanding a 
discrepancy between the value of the asset transferred and the debt 
secured, since the amount of the debt is the measure of the value of the 
interest in the asset that is transferred.”174 It follows that as long as the 
exchange between Aptix and Mohsen was for “a reasonably equivalent 
value” and the amount of the debt—in this case the total loans were $9 
million—was “the measure of the value of the asset that is transferred,” 
there was no fraudulent transfer. Moreover, there was no dispute that the 
value of the collateral assets was significantly less than the $9 million 
loans.175 Accordingly, under California law, the grant of the security 
interest in Aptix’s property to Mohsen for the security of the preexisting 
loans of $9 million was not fraudulent.  
In addition, the Federal Circuit failed to observe decisions rendered by 
California bankruptcy courts that routinely address bankruptcy cases where 
debtors are insolvent while they transfer assets to secure antecedent debts 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at 930.  
 173. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.03 (West 2014) (“Value is given for a transfer or an 
obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt 
is secured or satisfied.”); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a) (West 2014) 
(“[V]alue is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, 
property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied.” (emphasis added)). Section 
24.004(d) of TUFTA defines “reasonably equivalent value” as “includ[ing] without limitation, a 
transfer or obligation that is within the range of values for which the transferor would have sold the 
assets in ’n arm’s length transaction.” Id. § 24.004(d). 
 174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.03 cmt. 3; see also id. § 3439.04 cmt. 3 (“The premise of this Act 
is that when a transfer is for security only, the equity or value of the asset that exceeds the amount 
of the debt secured remains available to unsecured creditors and thus cannot be regarded as the 
subject of a fraudulent transfer merely because of the encumbrance resulting from an otherwise 
valid security transfer. Disproportion between the value of the asset securing the debt and the size 
of the debt secured does not, in the absence of circumstances indicating a purpose to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors, constitute an impermissible hindrance to the enforcement of other creditors’ 
rights against the debtor-transferor.”); see, e.g., Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Holy Family Polish 
Nat’l Catholic Church, Carnegie, 19 A.2d 360, 361 (Pa. 1941).  
 175. See Aptix Corp., 140 F. App’x at 930.  
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or make payments to secured creditors. For example, in In re First Alliance 
Mortgage Co.,176 the Central District of California ruled that:  
Repayments of fully secured obligations—where a transfer 
results in a dollar for dollar reduction in the debtor’s 
liability—do not hinder, delay or defraud creditors [under 
California Civil Code section 3439.04] because the transfers 
do not put assets otherwise available in a bankruptcy 
distribution out of their reach, do not result in a diminution of 
the debtor’s estate, and therefore cannot be fraudulent.177  
Likewise, in In re Walters,178 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central 
District of California stated that “[a] proportionate reduction in rights or 
liability constitutes an exchange of reasonably equivalent value for 
fraudulent transfer purposes under the Bankruptcy Code or California state 
law.”179 
Moreover, California law allows Aptix to grant a security interest to 
Mohsen in preference to Quickturn. Indeed, California Code § 3432 states 
that “[a] debtor may pay one creditor in preference to another, or may give 
to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference to 
another.”180 In other words, California law does not treat a grant of security 
interest preference itself as a fraudulent transfer. California law clearly 
establishes that it “has been the rule for over 400 years, since the Statute of 
Elizabeth in 1571” that a transfer establishing a preference is not thereby 
fraudulent.181 
Also, as seen in Wyzard v. Goller,182 the grant of a security interest in 
preference of one creditor to another is not a badge of fraud under 
California law. In that case, Goller provided legal services to defend 
Manning and his corporation, Varigon, in a law suit brought by Wyzard.183 
Manning did not pay Goller for the legal services rendered for most of the 
duration of the litigation.184 Later, as the litigation was concluding and a 
large judgment was expected to be entered against the corporation, 
Manning executed a promissory note to Goller, promising to pay the 
amount he already owed to Goller, and granted Goller a security interest in 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 298 B.R. 652 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 
471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 177. Id. at 665.  
 178. Marshack v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Walters), 163 B.R. 575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). 
 179. Id. at 581.  
 180. Aptix Corp., 140 F. App’x at 931 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432 (West 2014)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 181. Wyzard v. Goller, 28 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571)); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432. 
 182. Wyzard, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 611–12. 
 183. Id. at 609.  
 184. Id. 
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the two properties owned by Manning.185 As expected, Wyzard received a 
judgment of $785,793.46 at the end of the litigation and “presumably” 
recorded the abstract of judgment.186 Manning then filed for bankruptcy,187 
and Goller subsequently foreclosed on the two property assets. Wyzard 
brought an action against Goller, challenging the security interest in the 
two property assets Goller received from Manning.188 
The Wyzard court, in rejecting Wyzard’s challenge, noted from the 
outset that even before 1872, under California law, a debtor may grant 
security for the payment of his preexisting debt in preference to another 
creditor.189 Further, California law has long permitted the insolvent debtor 
to prefer one creditor over others.190 The court also observed that 
California law, past and present, and other states’ law, all permit a debtor 
to prefer one creditor over others.191 Specifically, the court pointed to a 
leading case in this area that stated “a transfer made in good faith to secure 
an antecedent debt is declared to be for fair consideration, and does not 
amount to an act to ‘hinder, delay or defraud’ an unpreferred creditor.”192 
Moreover, courts “start with the proposition that a preference as such is not 
a fraudulent conveyance.”193 Accordingly, Manning’s grant of a security 
interest to Goller to secure the antecedent debt, even though such a transfer 
is a preference over Wyzard, is not itself a fraudulent conveyance.194 
Next, the Wyzard court examined whether there was any evidence to 
support Wyzard’s argument that “the circumstances of the transfer evoke 
some of the ‘badges of fraud’ from which an intent to defraud may be 
presumed.”195 The court stated that the noted indicia of fraud are:  
                                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 609 n.1.  
 188. Id. at 610.  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. The court observed that even before 1872 it had been recognized that a failing or 
insolvent debtor could prefer one creditor over another. Id. (“[I]t is difficult to perceive how the 
payment of a debt which [is] justly owed, and which was past due, can be tortured into an act to 
hinder, delay, and defraud creditors” (alteration in original) (quoting Randall v. Buffington, 10 Cal. 
491, 494 (1858)) (citing Wheaton v. Neville, 19 Cal. 41, 46 (1861)). “Subsequent cases continued 
the judicial refusal to set aside a preferential transfer solely because it worked a preference.” Id. 
(citing McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal. 2d 468, 474 (1936), Bradley v. Butchart, 217 Cal. 731, 744 (1933)). 
 191. Id. at 611–12. 
 192. Id. at 611 (quoting Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 19 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)). 
 193. Id. (quoting Smith v. Whitman, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1963)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Bos. Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating 
that if a hypothetical debtor who owes $10,000 to A and $20,000 to B, but has only $8000, which 
he uses to satisfy his debt to A, does not make “fraudulent conveyance” under the Uniform Act 
because payment satisfies a debt owed to legitimate creditor then B“must find a remedy in 
bankruptcy, or in some other, law”). 
 194. See Wyzard, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (“We conclude that the transfer to Mr. Goller, in 
payment for his legal services, while a preference, is not for that reason a transfer made to ‘hinder, 
delay or defraud’ Mr. Wyzard.”).  
 195. Id.  
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(a) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (b) 
whether the debtor had retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; (c) whether the transfer 
or obligation was disclosed or concealed; (d) whether the 
debtor was sued or threatened with suit before the transfer 
was made or obligation was incurred; (e) whether the transfer 
was of substantially all the debtor’s assets; (f) whether the 
debtor has absconded; (g) whether the debtor had removed or 
concealed assets; (h) whether the value of the consideration 
received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value 
of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation 
incurred; (i) whether the debtor was insolvent or became 
insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred; (j) whether the transfer had occurred shortly 
before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and (k) 
whether the debtor had transferred the essential assets of the 
business to a lienor who had transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor.196 
Applying the above factors to the case, the Wyzard court noted that: (1) 
the debtor, Manning in this case, had been successfully sued by Wyzard 
before he made the transfer of security interest to Goller; (2) the transfer 
was of substantially all of Manning’s assets; and (3) the transfer to Goller 
occurred shortly before Wyzard obtained the judgment against Manning.197 
These three factors, however, did not change the undisputed fact that 
Manning owed Goller a substantial sum for the legal services and the 
unpaid fees were secured by the two-property collateral.198 Therefore, the 
court concluded that “the transfer to Mr. Goller, in payment for his legal 
services, while a preference, is not for that reason a transfer made to 
‘hinder, delay or defraud’ Mr. Wyzard.”199 
The facts in Wyzard are similar to Aptix Corp.Yet, as explained above, 
the Federal Circuit failed to understand state law on secured transactions, 
preference, and fraudulent transfer under California statutes and case law. 
The Federal Circuit, contrary to long-established California law, has 
created new Federal Circuit law that the grant of a security interest for 
preexisting debt is a badge of fraud of property conveyance. Specifically, 
the Federal Circuit held that just because Mohsen received the security 
interest from the debtor for the antecedent loans before the debtor faced a 
judgment in favor of Quickturn, the transfer to Mohsen was fraudulent. In 
                                                                                                                     
 196. Id. at 612 n.4. In 2004, the California legislature codified these indicia of fraud by adding 
subsection (b) to § 3439.04 of the California Civil Code. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design 
Systems, Inc., 148 F. App’x 924, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 197. Wyzard, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 612.  
 198. See id. (noting that the arguable application of these factors did not “raise[] a triable issue 
of material fact”).  
 199. Id.  
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reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit ignored the fact that Aptix, the 
company itself, could not obtain funding from any other sources. No one 
except Mohsen had stepped up to provide the loans Aptix desperately 
needed to pay its employees and essential creditors in order to continue to 
operate as a business. Voiding Mohsen’s security interest, as the Federal 
Circuit did, sends a chilling message to individuals who use their personal 
resources in funding struggling companies in exchange for security interest 
in these companies’ patents. Under the Federal Circuit security interest 
law, these individuals will stop providing such funding because their 
acceptance of security interest in patents for the loans will be immediately 
viewed as a badge of fraud and subject to the Federal Circuit’s scrutiny, 
which disregards well-established state law on secured transactions and 
fraudulent transfers.200 
III.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S NEW TRUST LAW  
This Part discusses the Federal Circuit’s overreach in cases concerning 
liquidating a trust formed under a bankruptcy confirmation or liquidation 
plan. It examines the relationship between the trust and its beneficiary as 
well as existing state law in the area. It then presents a contrary Federal 
Circuit case in this area and critiques the decision. 
A.  The Role of Liquidating Trust Created in Bankruptcy 
In Chapter 11 Reorganization under bankruptcy law, the creation of a 
liquidating trust has become common.201 The liquidating trust is generally 
created to pursue causes of action for its beneficiaries, to oversee various 
litigation and tax matters, to prosecute avoidance actions, or to complete 
distributions to unsecured creditors.202 In other words, a liquidating trust, 
                                                                                                                     
 200. See Gugliuzza, supra note 110, at 1819 (“According to recent opinions by some Federal 
Circuit judges, the court has improperly leveraged choice-of-law doctrine to expand the scope of 
federal common law and restrict the scope of state contract law. This dispute over choice of law 
might be the next doctrinal battle within the Federal Circuit’s federalism relationship.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 201. See Chad P. Pugatch et al., The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 39, 61–62 (2008) (tracing the “widespread phenomenon” of liquidating trusts in 
bankruptcy reorganization). In fact, liquidating trusts are so common that bankruptcy courts have 
observed certain common practices of legal advisors to the trusts. See Peltz v. Worldnet Corp. (In re 
USN Commc’ns, Inc.), 280 B.R. 573, 600 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (noting the common practice 
regarding liquidating trust and that the attorneys who had represented the unsecured creditors’ 
committee are often the same attorneys to represent the liquidating trustee post-confirmation, in 
order to reduce cost). 
 202. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Midwest Coal Corp. (In re HNRC Dissolution Co.), 
No. Civ.A.04-158HRW, 2005 WL 1972592, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2005) (stating that the 
Liquidating Trust in the present case “was created to pursue causes of action for its beneficiaries, 
the holders of allowed unsecured claims against the Debtor’s estates, and the Liquidating Trustee 
has filed over 600 avoidance action complaints against third parties. . . . [T]he only tasks remaining 
32
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as some critics have noted, is where a bankruptcy trustee has expanded its 
power from the limited role of litigating claims belonging to the 
bankruptcy estate, to litigating claims of the creditors in post-confirmation 
plan against third parties.203 
To be classified as a liquidating trust for tax purposes, an entity must 
meet certain conditions set forth by the IRS Revenue Procedure.204 For 
instance, the trust must be created pursuant to a confirmed plan under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.205 The primary purpose of the 
liquidating trust is to liquidate the assets that have been transferred to the 
trust.206 The trust is typically funded with some of the bankruptcy sale’s 
proceeds and “vested with the [bankruptcy] estate’s litigation claims” that 
would then be prosecuted for potential cash to be subsequently distributed 
by the trustee to the beneficiaries.207 The liquidating trust, by law, has a 
duration of not more than five years from its creation date.208 Any 
extension of the trust’s existence beyond the statutory term must be 
approved by the bankruptcy court that has jurisdiction over the trust.209 
A liquidating trust is a state law trust that has become a useful tool for 
Chapter 11 reorganization plans. The Third Circuit provided the following 
                                                                                                                     
are for the Liquidating Trust to oversee various litigation and tax matters, prosecute avoidance 
actions on behalf of the remaining creditors, complete these appeals, and complete any distributions 
to the unsecured creditors”). 
 203. See generally Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Authority of Litigation Trusts: Why Post-
Confirmation Trustees Cannot Assert Creditors’ Claims Against Third Parties, 20 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 589 (2012) (offering a critique of the expansion of liquidating/litigation trusts). 
 204. See Paul Kugler et al., A Solid Overview of Liquidating Trusts, KPMG (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxnewsflash/Documents/us-
sep24-liquidating-trusts.pdf. 
 205. Id.  
 206. See Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685 (“A ruling generally will be issued that an 
entity is classified as a liquidating trust if the following conditions are met: . . . The trust is or will 
be created pursuant to a confirmed plan under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for the primary 
purpose, as stated in its governing instrument, of liquidating the assets transferred to it with no 
objective to continue or engage in the conduct of a trade or business, except to the extent reasonably 
necessary to, and consistent with, the liquidating purpose of the trust.”). 
 207. Pugatch et al., supra note 201, at 63 (“[A] liquidating trust is funded with some or all of 
the [bankruptcy] sale proceeds, and is vested with the estate’s litigation claims, which are then 
prosecuted, and hopefully liquidated to cash, by the liquidating trustee for the benefit of the 
creditors who, after confirmation, become the beneficiaries of the newly created trust.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 208. See Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685.  
 209. Id. (“The trust instrument must contain a fixed or determinable termination date that is 
generally not more than 5 years from the date of creation of the trust and that is reasonable based on 
all the facts and circumstances. If warranted by the facts and circumstances, provided for in the plan 
and trust instrument, and subject to the approval of the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over the 
case upon a finding that the extension is necessary to the liquidating purpose of the trust, the term 
of the trust may be extended for a finite term based on its particular facts and circumstances. The 
trust instrument must require that each extension be approved by the court within 6 months of the 
beginning of the extended term.”).  
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observation regarding Chapter 11 plans in In re Insilco Technologies210: 
While we typically think of Chapter 11 as the 
“reorganization” section of the Bankruptcy Code (as opposed 
to Chapter 7, the “liquidation” section), it is not uncommon 
for debtors to use the Chapter 11 process to liquidate. This is 
because Chapter 11 provides more flexibility and control in 
determining how to go about selling off the various aspects of 
the debtor’s business and distributing the proceeds. A typical 
mechanism for effecting a Chapter 11 liquidation is the 
creation of a “liquidating trust”—a state-law trust managed 
by a group of creditors that succeeds to the debtor’s assets 
and administers the liquidation and distribution process.211 
For example, in Holloway v. Dane,212 the court observed that in the 
related Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the liquidating trust established 
pursuant to the debtor’s reorganization plan was formed “for the purpose 
of recovering, administering and distributing estate assets for the benefit of 
unsecured creditors.”213 The liquidating trust in that case commenced an 
adversary proceeding against numerous corporate defendants for their 
alleged corporate misdeeds.214 
Similarly, in WRT Creditors Liquidation Trust v. C.I.B.C. Oppenheimer 
Corp.,215 under the confirmed reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court 
approved the Plan and the Liquidating Trust Agreement in which the 
debtor’s present and future litigation claims, rights of action, suits, or 
proceedings were transferred to the WRT Trust for the benefit of the 
unsecured creditors.216 The WRT Trust also received the right to solely 
coordinate the prosecution and settlement of litigation on behalf of and for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries and to distribute the proceeds to the 
beneficiaries.217 Thereafter, the WRT Trust brought at least nineteen 
adversarial proceedings against different defendants, asserting causes of 
action under state law and the Bankruptcy Code.218 
Importantly, as seen in the trust examples above, liquidating trusts are 
created for the beneficiaries. Indeed, to be classified as a liquidating trust, 
                                                                                                                     
 210. 480 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 211. Id. at 214 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 212. 316 B.R. 876 (S.D. Miss. 2004). 
 213. Id. at 878. 
 214. See id. at 878–79. 
 215. See 75 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
 216. Id. at 600 (“The Plan assigned all the debtor’s ‘Causes of Action’ to the WRT Trust, 
defining that term as ‘[a]ny and all causes of action, claims, rights of action, suits or proceedings, 
whether in law or equity, whether known or unknown, which have been or could be asserted, by the 
Debtor.’” (alteration in original)). 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. at 601. 
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the confirmed plan and any separate trust documents “must provide that the 
beneficiaries of the trust will be treated as the grantors and deemed owners 
of the trust.”219 Structurally, the liquidating trust is administered by a 
liquidating trustee who must adhere to the duty described in the trust 
agreement and the duty of loyalty and good faith in operating the trust for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries.220 
Who are the beneficiaries of a liquidating trust? The beneficiaries of the 
liquidating trust are typically the creditors of the bankruptcy estate who 
“trade their creditor status for a beneficiary interest in the trust”221 and are 
generally identified in the confirmed plan and trust documents.222 The 
beneficiaries of a trust are therefore the deemed “owners of the trust” 
res.223 The trustee is typically appointed to oversee the liquidating trust in 
bringing claims belonging to creditors against third parties in a post-
confirmation plan.224 A question arises as to whether the beneficiaries, as 
owners of the liquidating trust, have standing to bring litigation against 
third parties in cases involving the property held by the trust. 
B.  Morrow v. Microsoft Corp. 
Another decision rendered by the Federal Circuit, Morrow v. Microsoft 
Corp.,225 centers on a bankruptcy asset, namely, a patent held by a 
liquidating trust for the beneficiary creditors.226 The At Home Corporation 
(AHC) was in bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court ordered a plan wherein 
several trusts were formed as successors to AHC to orderly liquidate the 
assets in September 2002.227 The liquidation plan created a two-tiered trust 
system wherein the General Unsecured Creditors’ Liquidating Trust 
(GUCLT) was established to function as trustee to various creditors, and 
the At Home Liquidating Trust (AHLT) was established as trustee to 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685.  
 220. See Dennis Montali et al., Recent Developments in Business Bankruptcy—2010, 31 CAL. 
BANKR. J. 665, 684 (2011) (providing an example of a liquidating trustee who was found by a 
bankruptcy court to have “breached (1) his duty of loyalty and good faith, (2) the trust agreement, 
(3) his duty to keep and render accounts, (4) his duty to preserve trust assets and pursue claims of 
the trust, and (5) his duty to keep trust assets separate”); see also Harrow v. Street (In re Fruehauf 
Trailer Corp.), 431 B.R. 838, 850–52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, No. CV 10–02312 DDP, 2011 
WL 2014672 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2011). 
 221. Pugatch et al., supra note 201, at 61.  
 222. Rev. Proc. 94-45, 1994-2 C.B. 684, 685. 
 223. Id.  
 224. See Morris, supra note 203, at 600–01 (“Typically, a plan establishes a state-law trust to 
hold the estate’s claims against third parties and appoints the bankruptcy trustee as the post-
confirmation trustee who is charged to litigate those claims.”). 
 225. 499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 226. Id. at 1335.  
 227. Id.  
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GUCLT to facilitate IP infringement litigation on GUCLT’s behalf.228 This 
meant AHLT was the trustee and GUCLT was the beneficiary. In other 
words, AHLT held only bare title to the assets, and GUCLT possessed all 
the proprietary interest and ownership rights to the assets.229 That also 
meant that, pursuant to the liquidation plan, the patent asset was owned by 
GUCLT and merely held by AHLT in trust and for the benefit of 
GUCLT.230 
Subsequently, GUCLT brought a patent infringement action against 
Microsoft. Microsoft challenged GUCLT’s standing to bring the patent 
suit, and the district court found that GUCLT had standing to sue under 
bankruptcy law principles and “based on its trust beneficiary status.”231 
Three years later, in 2006, upon completion of the discovery process in the 
litigation, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment on invalidity and 
infringement issues.232 The district court ruled for Microsoft on invalidity 
and noninfringement.233 Thereafter, the parties appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.234 
The Federal Circuit focused on whether GUCLT had standing to sue 
Microsoft for the patent infringement. The panel majority framed the 
question as “how [do] bankruptcy or trust law relationships affect the 
standing analysis in a patent infringement case” and noted that the issue 
was “a question of first impression in this court.”235 The panel majority 
held that GUCLT’s rights under the liquidation plan failed to situate 
GUCLT in one of the Federal Circuit’s two categories where it could sue in 
its own name or maintain a co-plaintiff status in the infringement suit.236 
Specifically, the panel majority held that GUCLT had no standing to sue 
Microsoft for patent infringement under patent law even though AHLT had 
been added as a co-plaintiff.237 The majority vacated the infringement 
judgment below and reversed the district court’s decision for lack of 
standing.238 
Consequently, after three costly years of litigating the patent 
infringement case and after the district court made its findings on the 
merits, the Federal Circuit brushed everything aside to focus on standing. 
By ruling that GUCLT lacked standing, the Federal Circuit eviscerated the 
district court’s findings on invalidity and infringement. This means the 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
Defendant-Appellant Hank M. Spacone at 2, Morrow, 499 F.3d 1332. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. at 2, 4.  
 231. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1335. 
 232. Id. at 1336.  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 1339–44. 
 237. See id. at 1344. 
 238. Id. 
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only choice GUCLT and AHLT plaintiffs have is to restart the case all over 
in the district court. Most troublesome of all, under the panel majority’s 
ruling, GUCLT cannot be a plaintiff in the new patent infringement case. 
Likewise, both GUCLT and AHLT together cannot be plaintiffs in the new 
patent infringement suit if the suit is subsequently initiated in the district 
court!  
Who then can be the proper plaintiff? It seems from the Federal 
Circuit’s decision that AHLT is the proper plaintiff because it owns the 
patent. But the liquidation plan endorsed by the bankruptcy court does not 
grant AHLT the right to bring patent infringement litigation,239 and that 
means AHLT cannot be the plaintiff. Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
ignored the fact that AHLT had already been added as a plaintiff in the 
patent litigation when the court vacated the entire judgment on the merits 
of invalidity and noninfringement. What good did it or would it accomplish 
when the “proper” plaintiff, AHLT, had already been overlooked by the 
Circuit? Most costly, of course, is to restart the entire litigation with AHLT 
as the sole plaintiff so the district court will subsequently reach the same 
results on the merits of invalidity and noninfringement. The parties will 
waste precious resources to litigate the case at the district court level, and 
then to appeal the case to the Federal Circuit again? Surely, precious 
financial and judicial resources will be wasted because GUCLT cannot 
even be a co-plaintiff pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s decision. While the 
Federal Circuit denied GUCLT the right to be a co-plaintiff in the patent 
infringement litigation, the liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy 
court vested GUCLT with just that right. Needless to say, the Federal 
Circuit has created chaos in the name of patent stewardship. 
C.  The Federal Circuit’s New Trust Law 
How did the Federal Circuit cause this disarray? In reaching its 
decision, the majority relied on its own view of the facts and understanding 
of trust law, particularly its own understanding of liquidating trusts created 
in post-confirmation bankruptcy proceedings. The panel majority naively 
believed that the liquidation plan merely created GUCLT and AHLT as 
trusts for purposes of distributing the assets and rights among the trusts.240 
The majority mechanically recounted that GUCLT received the rights to 
bring various causes of action for the estate, including claims of IP 
infringement.241 AHLT was “in charge of conducting the administrative 
wind-down of the company’s business” and was given the ownership right 
in the IP by default.242 Therefore, AHLT “received legal title to 
                                                                                                                     
 239. Id. at 1335 (noting that GUCLT “received the rights to all other causes of action,” 
including “claims for misappropriation or infringement of AHC’s intellectual property rights” 
(emphasis added)).  
 240. See id. (“The liquidation plan distributed certain assets and rights among the trusts.”). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
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the . . . patent under the liquidation plan though it did not have the right to 
sue third parties for infringement of the patent.”243 The majority mentioned 
that “AHLT’s assets were to be managed for the benefit of the bondholders 
and the general creditors of . . . GUCLT.”244 What the majority ignored or 
misunderstood was the relationship between GUCLT and AHLT. 
The relationship between the litigation trust GUCLT and liquidating 
trust AHLT was itself also a trust wherein AHLT was the trustee and 
GUCLT was the beneficiary. A careful examination of the liquidation plan 
reveals that the plan created a two-tiered trust system. In the first tier, 
GUCLT functioned as a trustee to the general creditors. In the second tier, 
AHLT functioned as a trustee to GUCLT and was the liquidation plan 
agent facilitating patent infringement litigation for the benefit of the 
beneficiary GUCLT. More precisely, AHLT held the patent only in bare 
title and that is why the liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy court 
dictated that while AHLT held the bare title, it had no power to initiate 
patent infringement litigation.245 This system is how the liquidation plan 
empowered GUCLT with the right to bring a patent infringement suit. 
GUCLT, as the beneficiary, ultimately had all the benefits and proprietary 
interest or ownership rights to the patent.246 In other words, from the 
liquidation plan approved by the bankruptcy court, for the trust relationship 
to work as created under the plan, the patent is truly owned by the 
beneficiary GUCLT and merely held by AHLT in trust and for the benefit 
of the beneficiary GUCLT.247 Therefore, either GUCLT by itself, or 
GUCLT and AHLT together, should have been permitted to bring the 
patent infringement action against third party infringers, as they were 
created and approved by the bankruptcy court to liquidate the property 
assets per the confirmation plan. The majority ignored the trust relationship 
and viewed it strictly through the lens of patent law, holding that GUCLT 
and AHLT could not maintain the patent suit, as they could not be squarely 
categorized as co-plaintiffs for standing purposes.248 
Additionally, the majority had its own understanding of patent law and 
forced the trust relationship between GUCLT and AHLT into its rigid 
categories. The majority created three categories of plaintiffs in analyzing 
constitutional standing issues in patent infringement.249 The majority centered 
its division of the categories and “constitutional injury in fact” on whether the 
plaintiff possessed “exclusionary rights.”250 The “exclusionary rights” 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. 
 245. See Petition for Panel Rehearing, supra note 228, at 1–3. 
 246. Id. at 4.  
 247. See id. at 2–4. 
 248. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1343–44. 
 249. Id. at 1339. 
 250. Id. (“The party holding the exclusionary rights to the patent suffers legal injury in fact 
under the [patent] statute.”). 
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identified by the majority were the “legal right to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention . . . or 
importing the invention.”251 Specifically, the first category included a 
patentee who holds “all the exclusionary rights” and “suffers constitutional 
injury in fact” from patent infringement and therefore could bring 
infringement suits in its own name.252 Under the first category, GUCLT 
obviously would not have standing to bring the patent infringement action 
against Microsoft in its own name as it was not the patentee.  
The second category of plaintiffs, the majority asserted, “hold 
exclusionary rights . . . but not all substantial rights to the patent.”253 The 
majority, however, failed to explain the meaning of a plaintiff with all 
exclusionary rights, but without all substantial rights. Did the majority 
mean exclusionary rights are substantial rights? Do exclusionary rights 
cover substantial rights? The majority merely stated that the plaintiffs in 
the second category were the exclusive licensees who suffered injury 
caused by any party that “makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the 
patented invention.”254 The majority announced that the second category of 
plaintiffs could bring patent infringement suits in their own name but had 
to include the patentee as a co-plaintiff “to satisfy prudential standing 
concerns.”255 Did the majority mean that plaintiffs in the second category 
fulfill the constitutional standing requirement on their own and that 
including the patentee as a co-plaintiff has nothing to do with 
constitutional standing, but prudential standing? Did the majority mean 
that the second category of plaintiffs must satisfy both constitutional 
standing and prudential standing concerns, and by adding the patentee 
AHLT as co-plaintiff, both are now met?  
Peculiarly, under the second category, the majority denied GUCLT 
standing to maintain the patent infringement litigation against Microsoft, 
even after AHLT was brought into the action as a co-plaintiff to the suit.256 
The majority pointedly did not give both GUCLT and AHLT the right to 
maintain patent infringement litigation for lack of standing. Specifically, 
the majority asserted that there was a lack of constitutional standing, 
                                                                                                                     
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 1339–40. 
 253. Id. at 1340. 
 254. Id. (“As the grantee of exclusionary rights, this plaintiff is injured by any party that 
makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports the patented invention. Parties that hold the 
exclusionary rights are often identified as exclusive licensees, because the grant of an exclusive 
license to make, use, or sell the patented invention carries with it the right to prevent others from 
practicing the invention.” (citations omitted)). 
 255. Id. (“[T]hese exclusionary rights ‘must be enforced through or in the name of the owner 
of the patent,’ and the patentee who transferred these exclusionary interests is usually joined to 
satisfy prudential standing concerns.” (quoting Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 
U.S. 459, 467, 469 (1926))). 
 256. See id. at 1344 (“Joining the legal title holder only satisfies prudential standing 
requirements. It cannot cure constitutional standing deficiencies.”).  
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not prudential standing.257 In other words, it is unclear what the 
majority really meant! 
Consequently, without a good understanding of trust law and the 
relationship between a trust and its beneficiaries as owners of the 
property held by the trust, the Federal Circuit thrust GUCLT, the 
owners of the patents held by AHLT, into one of its rigid categories. It 
denied both GUCLT and AHLT the right to prosecute their patents 
against the infringer since they could not fit in any of the court’s 
categories. Both GUCLT and AHLT were liquidating trusts in the post-
confirmation plan phase of bankruptcy, which means they were 
temporal in scope for the purpose of liquidating the property on behalf 
of the creditors. These liquidating trusts have suffered a harsh fate as a 
result of the Federal Circuit’s decision; they will not be able to defend 
or prosecute the property that they were specifically created to serve.  
Under the Federal Circuit’s new trust law, liquidating trusts should 
never be created because they will never be allowed to bring a patent 
infringement suit against a third party. Alleged infringers will have 
the upper hand and will be permitted to continue the alleged 
infringing activities because the liquidating trusts are powerless 
without standing to maintain suit. Confirmation plans in bankruptcy 
proceedings will now be reluctant to create liquidating trusts 
involving patent assets for fear of the Federal Circuit’s overreaching 
its patent jurisdiction to prohibit them from bringing patent 
infringement litigation against alleged infringers. What good will the 
Federal Circuit’s new trust law do for state trusts? Hardly any can be 
identified, except to reinforce the banner of patent exceptionalism in 
the name of patent stewardship.258 
IV.  RESPECTING FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES IN STEWARDSHIP OF 
PATENT LAW 
Federalism is a bedrock principle of governance in the United States.259 
Matters of state law must be left to the sovereignty of the state, as dictated 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Id.  
 258. See id. at 1337 (“[T]he patent statutes have long been recognized as the law that governs who 
has the right to bring suit for patent infringement, even when patent rights have been transferred as a result 
of bankruptcy or proceedings in equity.”). The panel majority’s ruling has its own critics as seen in Judge 
Sharon Prost’s vigorous dissenting opinion. See id. at 1344–48 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 259. See, e.g., Jessica L. Hannah & Kevan P. McLaughlin, Comment, “On Certiorari to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals”: The Supreme Court’s Review of Ninth Circuit Cases During the October 2006 
Term, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 409, 422 (2008) (“One of the bedrock concepts of American 
government is the delineation of powers between the federal government and the states, i.e., the legal 
relationship called federalism.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (2007) (“In exercising this [judicial] discretion, federal courts 
should implement a bedrock tenet of judicial federalism: They have primary responsibility over federal 
law, whereas state tribunals control state law.”); see also Pac. Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 493 (1932) 
(“[I]n our dual system of government, action of the one government in the proper exercise of its sovereign 
powers, regarded as innocuous and permissible notwithstanding its incidental effects on the other, may 
become offensive and be deemed forbidden if it discriminates against the other.”).  
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by the Constitution.260 Commercial laws, including laws governing 
contracts, property transfers, secured transactions, fraudulent conveyances, 
and trusts, are strictly within the purview of the state.261 No federal court 
has the authority, in the absence of a conflicting federal law or policy, to 
unilaterally extend its reach into matters regulated by state law.262  
Under the Supreme Court’s precedent, federal courts must act with 
utmost care in imposing judicial preemption of state law.263 As a result, 
judicial preemption is justified only where there is conflict between federal 
law and state law.264 The requirement of such a conflict as a precondition 
controls both the permissibility of judicial preemption and “the scope of 
judicial displacement of state rules.”265 Further, even in the patent area 
where there is federal legislation, courts must still be mindful that 
                                                                                                                     
 260. For example, “police matters within the states” are left to the states, “in light of the 
bedrock principle of federalism.” Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 888 (2006); see also Elizabeth B. Wydra, Constitutional 
Problems with Judicial Takings Doctrine and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 120 (2011) (“States’ development of property 
law relies in many ways on the interaction between background common law principles and 
legislation. The [federal] judicial takings theory threatens to violate bedrock principles of federalism 
and disturb the incremental development of state property law by state and local policy makers and 
state courts.”). 
 261. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 597 (2002) 
(“Federalism is thus in many ways alive and well; state law also still controls most of the law of 
torts, contracts and commercial law, domestic relations, and criminal law.”); Viva R. Moffat, Super-
Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 45, 97 (2007) (“[C]ontract law has been a matter of state law, and there are many good reasons 
for this: basic principles of federalism and the desire to create laboratories of law, for example.”). 
Cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 
1324 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court settled in early precedents that “state courts have 
general jurisdiction, which includes final authority over their states’ laws and concurrent 
jurisdiction over cases involving federal law”). 
 262. See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1994) (noting that the 
permissibility and scope of the displacement of state rules are predicated on a conflict between 
federal policy or interest and the use of state law). 
 263. Id. at 87 (“Our cases uniformly require the existence of such a conflict as a precondition 
for recognition of a federal rule of decision.”); see Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 
F.3d 1239, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (per curiam). 
 264. O’Melveny & Meyers, 512 U.S. at 87 (stating that precedents dictate that cases justifying 
the “judicial creation of a special federal rule” to preempt state law are “‘few and restricted,’ limited 
to situations where there is a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the 
use of state law’” (citations omitted) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) and 
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966))). The limitations as imposed by the 
Supreme Court are due to the fact that federal courts, “unlike their state counterparts, are courts of 
limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.” Id. at 90 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 265. Id. at 87–88 (“Not only the permissibility but also the scope of judicial displacement of 
state rules turns upon such a conflict.”). 
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“Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the 
states”266 and therefore where there are no specific statutory provisions on 
certain matters, courts must acknowledge that those matters “are 
presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law.”267  
As explained in the Abraxis Bioscience dissent, the Federal Circuit 
provided no justification for its judicial preemption of New York contract 
law, the law selected by the sellers and acquirers in the complex assets 
transfer.268 The Federal Circuit failed to identify any “significant conflict” 
between federal patent law and New York state contract law, as required 
by the Supreme Court.269 The Federal Circuit displaced state contract law 
with its own precedents of patent assignments.270 The decision is improper 
judicial preemption of state contract law.271 It is a complete disregard of 
doctrinal federalism. Similarly, in Aptix Corp., the Federal Circuit 
extended its reach in secured transactions and fraudulent conveyances—
two areas that are exclusively within the provenance of state law—and 
ignored long-established state law.272 The Federal Circuit arrogantly 
brushed aside state commercial statutes for secured transactions, state 
fraudulent conveyance statutes, and state decisional laws interpreting the 
statutes.273 Again, the Federal Circuit provided no explanation and 
justification for its judicial preemption.274 The Federal Circuit continued its 
assault on doctrinal federalism in Morrow when it reached into the area of 
state trust law and imposed its misunderstanding of liquidating trusts, 
beneficiaries as the true owners of the trust res, and the trustee’s function 
for the benefits of the true owners.275 
Nothing good can come from the Federal Circuit’s disregard of 
doctrinal federalism. Business entities, startups, investors, and commercial 
lawyers face enormous uncertainty when the Federal Circuit extends its 
reach into areas of well-established state law. The Federal Circuit must 
heed the Supreme Court’s direction in judicial preemption and federalism. 
In commandeering stewardship of patent law, the Federal Circuit has no 
authority to exert its power in matters belonging to states. In today’s 
economy, a commercial transaction—be it a sale of assets, a security 
interest conveyance, or a liquidation trust—will often include patents. Just 
because a commercial transaction includes patents does not allow the 
Federal Circuit to exercise its patent jurisdiction to affect judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 267. O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85. 
 268. Abraxis Bioscience, 672 F.3d at1241 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 269. Id. (quoting O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 79) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id.  
 272. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App’x 924, 931–32 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 273. See id. 
 274. See id. 
 275. See supra Section III.C. 
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preemption. Without articulating any significant conflict between federal 
and state law or policy, the Federal Circuit must not inject its authority into 
state law areas, creating costly results and unwarranted uncertainties. State 
law is the product of vast experience and wisdom, and businesses have 
long relied upon it to conduct their commercial transactions. The Federal 
Circuit, or any other federal court, cannot ignore the benefit that the dual 
sovereignty of doctrinal federalism provides.276 The destabilization of 
federalism, evidenced in the Federal Circuit’s cases, must promptly end in 
order to foster the richness of existing state law and preserve the vision of 
governance as dictated by and in the Constitution.277 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has positioned itself as the Patent Court 
of the United States. Admirably, the Federal Circuit has produced an 
influential body of patent law with impact beyond national boundaries. 
However, the Federal Circuit’s overreach into commercial law under the 
disguise of patent law is counterproductive. To maintain its stewardship of 
patent law, the court should not invoke patent jurisdiction to rationalize its 
decisions concerning commercial law that dramatically alter established 
commercial law. Encroachment on commercial law, which is within the 
provenance of state law, destabilizes federalism causing uncertainty in 
state law areas. The Federal Circuit must restrain itself, as it has no 
authority to inject itself into state law making. 
                                                                                                                     
 276. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 685, 765–66 (1991) (“[R]ampant federal preemption forms an ominous threat to the 
constricted space that remains to local and state politics.”). 
 277. Cf. Margaret Z. Johns, Should Blackwater and Halliburton Pay for the People They’ve 
Killed? Or Are Government Contractors Entitled to a Common-Law, Combatant-Activities 
Defense?, 80 TENN. L. REV. 347, 353 (2013) (“[B]edrock constitutional principles dictate that the 
judicial branch should not recognize a combatant-activities defense that would improperly intrude 
on state sovereignty in violation of federalism principles.”). 
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